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Children in Poverty: In Search of State and Federal
Constitutional Protections in the Wake
of Welfare "Reforms"
April Land'
I. INTRODUCTION

The faces of the human suffering caused by welfare reform are faces
of children. Children, along with their parents, are going without basic
necessities. Hundreds of thousands of children have already lost access to
welfare benefits, and thus, their basic means of subsistence, as a result of
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, 1 and its implementation by the states.
While the President of the United States boasted that we had come to
"the end of welfare as we know it, "2 and governors across the coun~ reported with pride that welfare rolls had been dramatically reduced, the
poorest children in America became poorer as a result of the loss of their
welfare benefits. 4 Over 400,000 more children are now in extreme poverty
as a result the 1996 welfare reforms.5 The changes in the existing welfare
laws have not only stripped millions of families of meager subsistence
income6 but also undermined previously afforded federal constitutional protections.
The elimination of the federal entitlement to welfare and the shifting
of essential policy making to states raises serious questions about the procedural due process rights of people in poverty. It also changes the focus of
the legal battleground for welfare families, bringing important state constitutional issues into focus across the nation. In New Mexico, for example, the
state's initial welfare reform program was held to violate the separation of

'April Land, Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law,
L.L.M. Georgetown University, 1997, Staff Attorney, Neighborhood Legal Services Program,
Washington D.C. 1990-1995, University of Wisconsin-Madison, J.D. 1987, Reed College,
B.A. 1983. This Article is dedicated to Bob Ericson, with thanks to Brian Matise, Molly
Schmidt-Nowara, Lynne Marie Paretchan, and Rob Schwartz for their assistance and support,
and to Dean Robert Desiderio for the research grants that made this work possible.
1
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (relevant portions are codified as amended in
scattered sections at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-1307 ( 1991 & Supp. 2000)).
2
President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks by the President to Officials ofMissouri
and Participants of the Future Now Program, June 14, 1994, at 3, available at 1994 WL
258369.
3
Merrill Matthews Jr., Welfare Reform Shows Signs ofSuccess, ALBUQUERQUE], Apr.
II , 1999, at A3.
4
WENDELL PRIMUS ET AL, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, THE INITIAL
IMPACTS OF WELFARE REFORM ON THE INCOMES OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAM ILlES 37 ( 1999).
5
CHlLDREN'S DEFENSE FUND & NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, WELFARE
TO WHAT: EARLY FINDINGS ON FAMI LV HARDSHIP AND WELL-BEING 2 {1998) (hereinafter
WELFARE TO WHAT).
6
See generally Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at 43, 46 (citing Urban Institute reports commissioned by Secretary
of Health and Human Services).
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powers provision ofthe state constitution because ofthe Governor' s attempt
to bypass the legislative process.7 As states are swept up in the national
effort to decrease the welfare rolls, advocates for people in poverty must
look increasingly to state constitutions for relief. This Article will explore
some of the analytical tools that may be useful in view of this major shift in
the legal landscape.
Overall, the Article emphasizes that in exploring the potential constitutional protections for families in poverty, it will be important to focus on the
detrimental effects that welfare reforms have on children. By emphasizing
the impact that welfare cuts have on children, it may be possible to provide
a framework for judicial review that minimizes the prejudices and stigmas
about welfare recipients and focuses on the harm caused by the elimination
of access to basic subsistence income. The focus on harm to children is
important because our society does not acknowledge every person's "inevitable dependency"8 and has, therefore, stigmatized rather than empathized
with welfare recipients. The stigmatization of welfare recipients is compounded and reinforced by the history of racial discrimination in welfare
policl and the media coverage of welfare recipients.10 Each of these have,
in tum, led to a strong link between people's perceptions about welfare and
their racial prejudices.•• With a change in focus away from the behavior of
parents to the suffering of children, it is more likely that courts will acknowledge constitutional protections for families in poverty at the state and
possibly even at the federallevel. 12 For example, procedural protections may
be strengthened by highlighting a child's right to continuing benefits in the
face of new program requirements. Equal protection claims by illegitimate
children may be more successful now that the clearly articulated purpose of
federal reforms is to prevent out-of-wedlock births.13
Further, in this epoch of "New Federalism" and state welfare law
innovation, state courts have the exciting opportunity to develop the rich
texts of their own state constitutions. State courts should develop this text
to act as a check on legislative measures that are projected to plunge eight
million families with children further into poverty.14

7

New Mexico ex rei. Taylor v. Johnson, 96 1 P.2d 768, 775 (N. M. 1998).
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of
Subsi~, 9 STAN. L. & POL' Y REv. 89, 92 ( 1998).
Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Neilson, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy Tales:
Welfare Refo rm and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 HOW. L.J. 473,474( 1995);
Lucy A. Williams, Race Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare
Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. 1. I 159, I I6 1 ( 1995); Martha Minow, The Welfare
ofSingle Mothers and Their Children, 26 CONN. L. REV. 817, 83 7 ( 1994); see also inf ra Part
IVB(blc (discussing racial discrimination in development of national welfare policy).
0
Williams, supra note 9, at 1161 .
11
See generally MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE ( 1999) (exploring
American perspectives on welfare).
12
Barbara Sard, The Role ofthe Courts in Welfare Reform, 22 CLEARJNGHOUSE REv.
367, 375 (1988); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309,320-22 ( 1993) (stating that
societal consensus underlies constitutional protections).
13
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 60 I(a)(3), 602(a)( I )(A)(v) (Supp. 2000). See discussion infra Part
IVB(c/. (discussing classifications based on illegitimacy).
4
Edelman, supra note 6, at 46.
8
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Part II of this Article describes the radical shift in the national public
assistance program worked by the 1996 passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("PRA" or the "Act"). This
part explains the elimination of the previous federal program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and its replacement with the blockgrant program called Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). It
also explains some of the stated reasons for those changes. Part III exposes
the harm that these changes have already caused, and are likely to cause, to
children in poverty. Part N explores the application of federal constitutional
analysis in view of the radical shift in federal welfare policy. Without
constitutionally protected procedural rights, other constitutional rights can
ring hollow for families in dire poverty. 15 Because the PRA, on its face,
raises serious questions about whether procedural due process protections
remain for welfare recipients, this issue is examined first. Part N further
discusses some of the limited opportunities for substantive due process and
equal protection claims under the federal constitution, surveying some ofthe
critiques of the federal analysis. Part V renews the call for development of
protections for children under state constitutional provisions. This Part
explains why state courts should develop a state constitutional jurisprudence
of positive rights for children who will find themselves in dire poverty as
the new welfare regime holds them accountable for the actions, and inactions, of their parents, leaving them without access to the basic necessities
of life.
ll. WELFARE AS WE HAVE KNOWN IT AND THE 1996 "REFORM":
CHANGES TO THE LAW AND THE STATED PURPOSES

The PRA essentially changed welfare from a federal entitlement program to a system of block grants to the states. These block grants include
both federal incentives and limitations on the use of federal funds. The
contrast between the purposes of the former AFDC program and the new
block grant system of the PRA casts light on the dramatic change in welfare
policy.
The first federal entitlement program was created by the Social Security Act of 1935, 16 and it was designed to help support poor children. The
initial federal program, Aid to Dependent Children, 17 was a grant program
to the states created to protect widows and their children during the Great
Depression. The program was expanded to include families of women
widowed by World War II and expanded further, in 1962, when it took the
title of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). 18
AFDC was created to encourage the care of dependent children in their
homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each state to furnish finan15
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process
Counterrevolution, 75 DENY. U. L. REv. 9, 42 ( 1997).
16
Pub. L. No. 74-53 I , 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered sections at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 30 1-1397 (1991 & Supp. 2000)).
17
See. e.g., Pub. L. No. 78-257,58 Stat. 277 (no currently effective U.S.C.A. sections).
18
Pub. L. No. 87-543, 76 Stat. 172, 185 (codified as amended in scattered sections at
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-1397 (1991 & Supp. 2000)).
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cial assistance and services to individuals caring for needy dependent children. The program was a federal safety net with the intent of helping to
maintain and strengthen family Iife. 19 Under the program, which set national
eligibility standards, states had to provide detailed and specific welfare
plans to the federal government. If the plan met federal requirements, the
federal government provided matching funds for all eligible participants. If
potential recipients could meet the eligibility requirements set by the federal
regulations and the federally approved state welfare plans, they were entitled to subsistence benefits at levels set by the states.
In contrast, the PRA creates a block grant system that is directed towards minimizing welfare dependency and which, in practice, penalizes
poor children for their poverty. The Act eliminated the AFDC program and
created Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).20 The first finding in the PRA states that "[m]arriage is the foundation of a successful
society."21 Many of the other findings in support of the Act relate the detrimental impact of out-of-wedlock births. 22
The other stated purposes of the Act are to increase the flexibility of
the states in operating assistance programs and to "end the dependence of
needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work,
and marriage.'m Thus, states are encouraged to develop their own welfare
programs with limited federal regulation. However, under the new law,
federal regulations limit the benefits that a state may award to a family
under the program. So, for example, under the previous ADFC program, a
family that lived in dire poverty would qualify for welfare benefits as long
as they continued to meet the program requirements. However, under the
new law, the states are prohibited from providing more than 60 months of
cash assistance to any family. The new law also sets increasingly high rates
of mandatory job participation that states must meet to receive full funding
of their block grants under TANF. 24
While the former law limited the state's right to interfere with a family's entitlement to welfare benefits, the PRA states that there is "NO INDIVIDUAL ENTITLEMENT" to benefits and that the Act "shall not be
interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any State
program funded under this part.'' 25 Thus, on its face, the Act evinces a
congressional intent to eliminate any federal entitlement and, therefore,
potentially any property right to cash assistance. The entitlement to benefits
had been an essential underpinning of due process protection triggering
19

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-602 (Supp. 2000).
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2113 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 601
(Supp. 2000)).
21
42 U.S.C.A. § 601 (Supp. 2000).
21Jd.
23
/d. § 601(a)(2).
24
The law does allow for some exceptions, however, as in Massachusetts no exceptions
are being made, even in compelling circumstances. See generally MASSACHUSETTS LAW
REFORM INSTITUTE DOCUMENTATION PROJECT AND THE FAMILY ECONOMIC INITIATIVE,
SECOND REPORT: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE THOUSANDS OFFAMILIES LOSING BENEFITS UNDER
THE MASSACHUSETTS TIME LIMIT (1999) (showing systemic denials of requests for
exemptions from time limits) (hereinafter CLOSER LOOK).
25
42 U.S.C.A. § 60 I(b) (Supp. 2000).
20
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constitutional protection for families receiving benefits under the AFDC
program and related welfare laws.26

ill.

THE PROBLEM FACING CHILDREN

While most sectors in the American economy are enjoying prosferity
and mainstream head) ines report the lowest poverty rates in decades,2 more
children are living in extreme poverty. 28 Extreme poverty is defined as
having a household income that is below one-half the poverty line (or less
than $6,401 a year for a three-person family in 1997).29 Recent studies have
tied the increase in extreme child poverty to the PRA. 30 Many of the provisions of the Act, including the mandatory work requirements and lifetime
limits on welfare benefits, threaten the health and safety of children in
poverty. As one commentator has concluded, "[t]he new welfare law poses
substantial dangers, and is likely to exacerbate many long-standing troubles
afflicting the children of low-income families. " 31
A recent study of the effects of the 1996 welfare reforms on children
found that the number of children in extreme poverty grew by 400,000
between 1995 and 1997: "The total number of children in extreme poverty
rose from about 6 million in 1995 to 6.3 million in 1996 and crept up to
nearly 6.4 million in 1997. "32 This increase "is startling at a time of strong
economic growth and a decline in overall child poverty, when extreme
poverty should have been declining. It can be traced directly to the declining
number of children lifted above one-half of the poverty line by government
cash assistance to the poor :m Another study found that large numbers of
families in the post-TANF welfare population sampled do not meet their
families' basic needs for shelter and utilities.34
Poverty also directly threatens children's health and education and
future earning ability. "Deep poverty-especially during the earliest years
of childhood- has particularly clear, long-lasting effects on children's
academic learning and school completion."35 As adults, children raised in

26

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,261-62 {1970).
Richard Wolf & Beth Belton, Poverty at 20-year Low, USA TODAY, Oct. I , 1999, at

27

lA.

21

WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 11 .
29/d.
ARLOC SHERMAN, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, POVERTY MATTERS: THE COST OF
CHILD POVERTY IN AMERICA 33 {1997); PRIMUS ET AL., supra note 4, at vi; NETWORK'S
NATIONAL WELFARE REFORM WATCH PROJECT, POVERTY AMID PLENTY: THE UNFINISHED
BUSINESS OF WELFARE REFORM 13- 14 ( 1999).
31
Mary Jo Bane & Richard Weissbourd, Welfare Reform and Children, 9 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 131 , 137 ( 1998).
32
WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 11 ; see also Peter Edelman, The Impact of
Welfare Reform on Children: Can We Get!/ Right Before the Crunch Comes?, 60 OHIO Sr.
L.J. 1493, ISO I ( 1999) (pointing out need to reweave basic safety net for families).
33
WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 2.
34
Mary Corcoran, Colleen Heflin & Kristine Siefert, Food Insufficiency and Material
Hardship in Post-TANF Welfare Families, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 95, 1412 (1999).
35
WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 2; see generally RON SUSKIND, A HOPE IN THE
UNSEEN: AN AMERICAN ODYSSEY FROM THE INNER-CITY TO THE IVY LEAGUE ( 1998) (giving
journalistic portrayal of challenges facing one boy's challenge to succeed in education).
30
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poverty earn 25 percent lower wages than adults who were not raised in
poverty. 36
In addition to economic devastation of children in poverty, the mandatory work requirements imposed by the Act pose significant threats to
children in many other ways.37 Requiring mothers to leave their children at
home or with day care providers can, and under many circumstances do,
pose a danger to children. The findings of a University of California/Yale
University study show that the welfare-to-work push on single mothers is
placing a growing number of children in mediocre and disorganized child
care settings.38 Incidence of severe maternal depression for this group of
women as well as reductions in both their employability and their children's
odds of thriving are three times higher than the national average.39 Parents
should have the opportunity to be at home to discourage children from
skipping school and to be present when older children come home after
school, especially in neighborhoods that are plagued with gang and drug
activity.40 Two leading authors summarize these effects:
Greater poverty combined with more poor mothers in the workforce
also means that more children will drop out of school to work in an effort
to take care of their own children, sick relatives or younger siblings. An
increase in a child' s share of family responsibilities is a prime cause of
failure in school .. . More children will suffer the shame of poverty, and
more children and parents will fear utter destitution and homelessness.
Many parents will also suffer serious stress and depression due to their
inability to provide for their families and the insecurity of unstable, lowwage jobs. This sustained ~arental depression can damage children in
every area of development. 1

Families leaving welfare have decreased access to food and stable
housing. "One in three children . .. in families who had recently lost TANF
assistance were 'eating less or skipping meals due to cost,' according to a
study of families served by 60 relief agencies during late 1997." 42 One in six
recipients in South Carolina reported having no way to buy food at some
time since leaving T ANF .43 "The rate of food deprivation was significantli;
worse for former TANF families than for families still receiving TANF."

36

WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 2.
See Gregory Williams, One Boy's View ofthe Welfare System, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1177,
1177 \1999) (giving account ofhunger and humiliation faced by one child in welfare system).
8
GROWING UP IN POVERTY PROJECT 2000, REMEMBER THE CHILDREN, MOTHERS
BALANCE WORK AND CHILD CARE UNDER WELFARE REFORM 71 (2000).
39
/d. at 5.
40
REBECCA M. BLANK, ITTAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING POVERTY
27-30 (1997).
41
Bane & Weissbourd, supra note 31, at 134 n.29 (citing S. Parker et al., Double
Jeopardy: The Impact of Poverty on Early Childhood Development, 35 PEDIATRIC CLINICS
OF N. AM. 6, 1233 (1988)); see also Corcoran, Heflin & Siefert, supra note 34, at 1413
(finding that post-TANF welfare population had disproportionately high rates of physical
health p,roblems, major depression, and domestic abuse).
4
WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 14.
37

43/d.

44/d.
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Nine cities of the thirty-four cities responding to a survey by the U.S. Conference of Mayors reported an increase in demand for emergency food, "due
mostly to welfare reform." 45 Risk of material hardship may also increase the
chances of state intervention into families and impacts other child welfare
programs. 46 Child protection officials in some states openly fearthatwelfare
reform will flood their systems with children whose parents cannot afford
to care for them.47 And, as one commentator points out, "given the strong
link between poverty and the juvenile court, it seems inevitable that the
problems of child poverty will become the problems of the juvenile court
system.48 The new welfare regime has also resulted in significant reductions
in Medicaid enrollment of children, posing further threats to their health.49
Further, families leaving welfare increasingly cannot pay their rent, and
therefore, former recipients show signs of greater homelessness. In Atlanta,
46 percent of the 161 homeless families with children interviewed in shelters had lost TANF benefits in the last 12 months.5° "Homelessness during
childhood is associated with higher infant mortality, asthma, chronic diarrhea, delayed immunizations, family separation and missed school." 51
In states where child poverty was already high, welfare cuts increase
the rates and the depth of child poverty. For example, in New Mexico, one
of the poorest states in the nation, 38.9% of children under 5 years old live
in poverty. 52 Measures that would increase these poverty rates, therefore,
pose a serious threat to children in New Mexico and other poor states.
In sum, children in poverty across the nation face the threat of extreme
poverty, which in turn threatens their health, their education, and their
access to food and shelter. The threats are compounded by welfare cuts
directly traceable to welfare reform, and by the attacks on the rights of their
families to seek continuing benefits while they challenge arbitrary, possibly
illegal, cuts in the benefits they need to have access to the basic necessities
oflife.
·
IV. FEDERAL CONSTITVTIONAL PROTECTIONS

For any substantive constitutional protections to be meaningful for
families in poverty, families must have an opportunity to challenge a reduction in their benefits prior to termination of those benefits. Therefore, it is

5

1d. at 15.
See Naomi Cahn, Children's Interest in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care,
and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 11 89 (1999) (exploring impact of federal adoption and foster
care policies).
47
M!Ml ABRAMOVITZ, UNDER ATTACK, FIGHTING BACK 39 (2000).
3
• KatherineHuntFederle, Child Welfare and the Ju venile Court, 600HJOST. L.J. 1225,
1245 \1999).
~sara Rosenbaum and Kathleen Maloy, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The
•
•

6

1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act and Its Impact on
Medicaid for Families with Children, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1442, 1471 (1999).
50
WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 16.
51
1d. at 17.
52 U.S. Census Bureau, Model-Based Income and Poverty Estimatesfor New Mexico in
/995, People Under Age 5 in Poverty, at <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/estimate/cty/cty35000.htm> (last revised Feb. 17, 1999).
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important to establish a federal baseline for federal procedural due process
protections. It is also important to examine whether the shift in welfare law
creates new opportunities for federal substantive due process and equal
protection challenges on behalf of children in poverty.

A. Procedural Due Process Challenges
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States provide that neither the federal government nor a state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."S3 In interpreting these constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court
has traditionally applied a two-part test. First, a court must determine if
there is an interest in life, liberty, or property. Second, if the Court has
found an interest, it must determine what procedural protections are constitutionally mandated.54 For decades the Supreme Court has consistently held
that welfare recipients had a property interest in continued receipt offederal
benefits under the first prong of the two-part test. Therefore, due process
was required prior to the elimination of any benefits. 55 However, the finding
of a property interest was based on the entitlement to welfare benefits, thus
raising questions about whether a property interest continues to exist in the
face of the statutory language stating that there is no entitlement to benefits.
The following discussion examines whether a property interest in benefits
exists under the new welfare regime. It then addresses the question of which
procedural protections are constitutionally mandated once a property interest is found.
Some of the most dramatic changes in the landscape of welfare rights
in the wake of recent reforms may be in the area of due process rights. 56
Since 1969, when the Supreme Court decided Goldbergv. Kelly, 57 there has
been no question that welfare recipients had a federally protected property
interest in their benefits under the AFDC program.58 In Goldberg, the Court
noted that procedural due process applied to the termination of welfare
benefits because "[s]uch benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for
persons qualified to receive them. Their termination involves state action
that adjudicates important rights."59 Thus, the Supreme Court implicitly
found that welfare recipients had a constitutionally protected property
interest in their benefits that guaranteed them a right to due process before
their benefits could be terminated.60

53
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fifth Amendment contains similar protections and is
applied to the Federal Government and the District of Columbia. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
s•LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 694-768 ( 1988).
55
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 ( 1970).
56
See generally Laura C. Conway, Will Procedural Due Process Survive After Aid to
Families with Dependent Children is Gone?, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 209, 217
(1996) (discussing impact ofPRA on procedural due process protections). The denials will
also include members of classes of individuals alleging harm from state actions.
57
397 u.s. 254 (1969).
58
!d. at 262 n.8.
59
/ d. at 262.
60
/d. at 265 .

No.4

CHILDREN IN POVERTY

787

1. Is There a Property Interest in Welfare Benefits Under the PRA?
Now that Congress has specifically attempted to eliminate a statutory
entitlement to benefits under the new welfare regime, the question arises as
to whether recipients have a federally protected property interest in continued welfare benefits that would entitle them to due process. In other words,
can they meet the first prong of the due process analysis: Is there a property
interest? Because the PRA, on its face, asserts that there is no statutory
entitlement, the issue of whether there is a property interest must be examined according to constitutional principles.

(a) Supreme Court Analysis; Rules or Mutually Explicit Understandings
As the Supreme Court explained in Board ofRegents v. Roth, 61
[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to it.
... Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law- rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits. 62

Thus, a property interest must be rooted in the statute defining eligibility for
the benefit. A person's interest in a benefit is a property interest for due
process purposes ifthere are such rules or mutually explicit understandings
that support the claim of entitlement to the benefit that he may assert.63 In
Roth, the Supreme Court held that the terms ofRoth's employment secured
absolutely no interest in re-employment. 64 However, in a later case, the
Supreme Court found that workers had protected interests in continued work
where the worker had relied on guidelines promulgated by the employer and
generally understood by state officials.6 In Perry v. Sinderman, a nontenured professor challenged his dismissal on due process (and other)

408 u.s. 564 (1972).
/d. at 577.
63
Nancy Morawetz, A Due Process Primer: Litigating Government Benefit Cases in the
Block Grant Era, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 98, 99 (June 1996); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 586 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Property interests are created and their
dimensions are defined by an independent source such as state statutes or rules entitling the
citizen to certain benefits."); Memphis Light v. Craft, 436 U.S. I, 9 ( 1978) ("Although the
underlying substantive interest is created by 'an independent source such as state law', federal
constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a ' legitimate claim of
entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause.").
64
Roth, 408 U.S. at 576; see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1976)
(holding that dismissal of police officer did not deprive him of property interest protected by
Fourte~nth Amendment where he was an employee at will under state law).
6
'Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 602- 03 ( 1972).
61

62
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gro~n.ds. 66 The Court held that "(a] person's interest in a benefit is a 'property . 1~terest for d~e process purposes if there are such rules or mutually
exphctt understa~dmgs that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit
and that he may mvoke at a hearing."67
Under this reasoning, the state's plans and regulations under the PRA
setting forth objective eligibility criteria for assistance create a property
interest in those benefits and therefore create a right to due process.

(b) The Process Cannot Define the Property Interest
Moreover, the nature of the property interest is not defined by the
processes for adjudicating those interests. In Cleveland Board ofEducation
v. Loudermil/,68 the Supreme Court found that a public employee, who could
only be terminated for cause, had a property interest in continued employment despite the limited procedures the state provided for challenging
terminations. 69 The Court overruled its previous holding that "[where] the
grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations
on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a
70
litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet. " In
rejecting the notion that litigants must "take the bitter with the sweet," the
Court explained that:
[t]he categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule
otherwise, the [Due ProcessJClause would be reduced to a mere tautology. "Property" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its
deprivation any more than can life or liberty. The right to due process "is
conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While
the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public]
employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such
71
an interest, once conferred, without appropriate proceduralsafeguards."

Accordingly, if the no entitlement language of PRA serves no other
purpose than to limit procedural rights, it may be constitutionally suspect
under the ruling in Loudermi/1.72 Nor can states rely on the procedures set
forth in state laws to define the nature or extent of constitutionally protected
procedural due process.

66

/d. at 595.
/d. at 60 I.
68
470 u.s. 532 (1984).
69
/d. at 541.
10 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 540(citingAmettv. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 ( 1974)).
71 /d. at 532,541 (quoting Arnett, 416 U.S at 167) (Powell, J., con-curring in part and
concurring in result).
12 But see Jackson v. Jackson, 857 F.2d 951 , 956 (4th Cir. 1988) (allowing short
eligibility period without discussingLoudermill); Holman v. Block, 823 F.2d 56, 59 (4th Cir.
1987) (same).
67
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(c) Recent Supreme Court Analysis of Property Interest in Worker's
Compensation Scheme
A 1999 due process case analyzing the existence of a property right
under a state workers' compensation scheme should also be noted. The
Court held in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan 73
that employees seeking payment of worker's compensation medical expenses had no property interest in the payment of disputed medical expenses before a hearing board determined whether the expenses were reasonable and necessary. 74 Because there was no property interest in the
disputed medical expenses prior to a hearin9 board determination, the
statutory scheme did not violate due process. 5 The majority opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated,
[f]or an employee's property interest in the payment of medical benefits
to attach under state law, the employee must clear two hurdles: First, he
must prove that an employer is liable for a work-related injury, and
second, he must establish that the particular medical treatment at issue is
reasonable and necessary. Only then does the employee's interest parallel
that ofthe beneficiary of welfare assistance in Goldberg and the recipient
of disability benefits in Mathews. 76

The majority opinion, thus, could be construed as suggesting that the property interest in welfare benefits would not attach until a right to benefits had
been established. It is somewhat difficult to square this opinion with the
holding in Goldberg that the existence of the statutory scheme created the
entitlement, and where the Court at least acknowledges a property interest
under the worker' s compensation scheme once eligibility has been established.77
Four of the Justices, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Souter,
and Justice Stevens, either wrote or joined concurring opinions. However,
each indicates concern about its potential impact on procedural due process
in cases where there is a failure to provide benefits. Justice Ginsburg wrote
that "due process requires fair procedures for the adjudication of respondents' claims. " 78 Justice Breyer and Justice Souter conclude that "there may
be individual circumstances in which the receipt of earlier payments leads
an injured person reasonably to expect their continuation, in which case that
person may well possess a constitutionally protected 'property' interest. " 79
Justice Stevens found that the employees' right to have their employers, or
the employers' insurers, pay for whatever is reasonable and necessary is
"unquestionably a species of property protected by the Due Process Clause

526 u.s. 40 (1999).
/d. at 61.
15/d.
73

74

16Jd.
71Goldberg,

397 U.S. at 266.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 61.
19 /d. (Breyer, J. , and Souter, J. , concurring).
18
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of the Fourteenth Amendment. "80 Thus, four of the nine Justices on the
current Supreme Court found that employees have some type of property
interest in medical care where a statutory scheme provides for payment.
Even the majority opinion states that once eligibility is established for
payment of certain bills, then an employee would have a property right in
the payment. 81
The majority opinion may not significantly change the Court's holding
in Goldberg. In any event, it should not be construed as undermining the
right of families' children, to establish a constitutionally protected property
interest in continuing benefits once benefits have been awarded.
(d) Administrative Discretion as a Factor in Determining a Property
Interest
Analysis of federal circuit court decisions on procedural due process
rights in the context of welfare, housing, and shelter cases also assist in
formulating effective arguments for welfare families. However, the circuit
courts differ in their approach to this issue. Some have held that applicants
and recipients have a sufficiently legitimate expectation ofbenefits to create
a property interest, while others have found no property interest existed
because of the extent of administrative discretion in determining qualifications for benefits.
For example, in Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry,82
the District of Columbia Circuit found that applicants for emergency shelter
had no property right. 83 The court distinguished the right to shelter benefits
in the District of Columbia from the right to benefits under the AFDC
statute in Goldberg, stating that "because persons meeting state AFDC
eligibility standards automatically qualified for benefits, eligible individuals
had a protected property interest in the receipt of the benefits. Where,
however, the legislature leaves fmal determination of which eligible individuals receive benefits to 'unfettered discretion' of administrators, no constitutionally protected property interest exists. "84
The court explained that
although D.C. law establishes objective eligibility criteria for homeless
families seeking shelter ... we hold that homeless families lack an expectation of shelter sufficient to create a property right: the city does not
provide enough shelter to meet the needs of all eligible families, it leaves
allocation of limited shelter space among eligible families to the unfettered discretion of city administrators, and nothing in District law prohibits administrators from allocating space in such a way that not all eligible
families receive shelter."85 It is the ''uncertainty of shelter due

80
81

1d. (Stevens, J., concurring).
1d. at 990.

82

107 F.3d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
lld. at 39.
84
ld. at 36.
85
ld. at 33.
8
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to ... administrative discretion which prevents the creation of a constitutionally protected entitlement. 86

Notably, the District of Columbia Code includes "no entitlement"
language in its shelter provision. 87 However, the court found the underlying
administrative discretion, rather than the "no entitlement" language, controlling. While the court considers the "no entitlement language" in reaching its
decision, it specifically expressed "doubt that 'no blanket entitlement disclaimers can by themselves strip entitlements from individuals in the face
of statutes or regulations ... conferring them. " 88 Thus, under this reasoning,
the PRA's provision of no entitlement would not be controlling. Rather,
courts would have to look at the underlying regulations and the amount of
administrative discretion.
In a Seventh Circuit case challenging the procedures for allocating
subsidized housing, the court held that applicants for Section 8 housing
provided by private landlords had no property interest in housing because,
under the pro~am, landlords could apply their own judgment to accept or
deny housing. 9 The court stated that the important inquiry is whether the
applicants "would be able to establish at a due process hearing facts which
would entitle them to Section 8 benefits. "90 In reaching its decision, the
court looked to a dissent in a similar case that developed the idea "that a
legitimate claim of entitlement is created only when the statutes or regulations in question establish a framework of factual conditions delimiting
entitlements which are capable of being explored at a due process hearing."91 Because, in the view of the Seventh Circuit, this program gives
landlords discretion regarding which tenants they will accept, potential
tenants have no property interest based on the grounds that applicants would
not be able to demonstrate entitlement to housing even if a hearing were
held.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, looking at the same Section 8 housing
program, found a protected property interest. In Ressler v. Pierce,92 the court
found that "the regulations and guidelines promul~ated pursuant to the
statute closely circumscribe an owner's discretion."9 The court also found
a constitutionally protected property interest in Section 8 housing benefits
"by virtue of her membership in a class of individuals whom the Section 8
Program was intended to benefit." 94
Thus, the extent to which administrative discretion undermines protected property interests is far from settled. Even in Eidson, where the
Seventh Circuit found no property interest in housing benefits, the court did
86

/d. at 37.

81

/d. at 38 ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to create an entitlement in any
homeless person or family to emergency shelter.").
88/d.
89
Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 45 3, 462-64 (7th Cir. 1984).
90
/d. at 459.
91
/d. (citing Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d
483, 494-95 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting)).
92
692 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1974).
93
/d. at 1215.
94/d.
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go on to state, "[i]fthe allocation of these scarce public benefits were utterly
uncontrolled, it is possible that the program would offend the 'concepts of
fairness and nonarbitrariness which are at the heart of the constitutional
requirement of due process of the law. "' 95 Thus, if the programs are too
discretionary, they might be challenged on those grounds for lack of standards, not only under the PRA requirements that the state set forth "objective criteria" but under the constitutional requirements of due process.
The existence of a constitutionally recognized property interest in
welfare benefits appears to tum on the amount of discretion welfare administrators have in whether or not to award benefits. The PRA limits the
discretion permissible in state welfare programs. The Act specifically provides that the state plan must "set forth objective criteria for the delivery of
benefits and the determination of eligibility and for fair and equitable treatment, including an explanation of how the state will provide opportunities
for adversely affected recipients to be heard in a State administrative or
appeal process."96 Thus, it will be important to explore the objective criteria
created by each state to determine whether they create a legitimate expectation among welfare applicants and recipients that they will receive
benefits fairly. And, by focusing on a state's objective criteria, it may be
possible for advocates to prove a property interest in T ANF benefits.
Alternatively, the failure to set forth objective criteria can be challenged on statutory grounds for failing to comply with the federal requirements and, on constitutional grounds, as lacking the basic elements of fairness and non-arbitrariness required by due process. It is also possible that
by focusing on the harm that arbitrary actions would have on the children
in a family, courts might be more willing to find a lack of constitutionally
mandated fairness.
(e) Importance of the Benefits as a Factor
In a recent case where advocates challenged New York's implementation of its welfare plan, a federal district court judge, faced with evidence
of families-including a woman pregnant with twins-going hungry for
days after applying for benefits and an 84% denial rate in a job center
created by the state to administer TANF fund, found that
(p]laintiffs also have an overarching property interest in their continued
receipt of food stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance ... Plaintiff's
allegations concerning various practices at job centers, such as providing
false or misleading infonnation to applicants about their eligibility,
arbitrarily denying benefits to eligible individuals, and failing to provide

95
Eidson, 745 F.2d at 464 (citing Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261,1279 (7th Cir.
1981 )); see also Fallon, supra note 12, at 310 ("In its commonest form, substantive due
process doctrine reflects the simple but far-reaching principle- also embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause--that government cannot be arbitrary.").
96
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2114 (relevant portions are codified as amended 42
U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(I)(B) (Supp. 2000)) (emphasis added).
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notice of hearing rights, state a viable due process claim under Sec.
1983.97

In Massachusetts, a state court judge found that "[ t]here is no more compelling statutory policy in need of enforcement than protecting families from
homelessness-a phenomenon increasing in severity and frequency, largely
due to inadequate public assistance. "98 Thus, faced with systemic denials of
benefits and the human suffering of women and children, courts have found
a protected property interest in benefits.
The finding of a protected property interest is also supported by some
commentators who contend that "the Court should incorporate the importance of the benefit at issue when deciding whether it is 'property' for the
purposes of Due Process,"99 and that "[d]ue process scrutiny should not
disappear simply because states afford discretion to their welfare administrators. One of the functions of due process should be to protect individuals
from arbitrary government decisions when those decisions affect the interests that are vital to the individual's survival." 100 "Any time a procedural
challenge is made to a government benefit program, the Court should consider both the degree of the entitlement to the benefit and the interest of the
people in receiving the benefit and in receiving procedural protections." 101
Moreover, there is concern that states will avoid developing sufficient
welfare eligibility criteria in order to forestall the creation of property rights.
The incentives for states to avoid regulation will be lessened only when the
Court recognizes that the importance of the benefits themselves can implicate the Due Process Clause. 102

97

Reynolds v. Guiliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 341 (S.D.N. Y. 1999), aff'd 198 F.3d 234
(2nd Cir. 1999).
98
Sard, supra note 12, at 385 (citing Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v.
Secretary of Human Serv., 511 N.E.2d 603 (Mass. 1987)).
99
Arlo Chase, Maintaining Procedural Protections for Welfare Recipients: Defining
Property for the Due Process Clause, 27 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 571, 572 (1997)
(analyzing due process protections in context of Wisconsin's W-2 (Welfare to Work)
program). Wisconsin has eliminated the right to pre-deprivation hearings. A claim of
protected property interest may be made if the Wisconsin Department of Workforce
Development unfairly changes the eligibility criteria for the W-2 program, for which it
apparently has state permission. !d.
100
/d. at 585.
101
/d. at 594.
102
Zietlow, s11pra note 15, at 59. Zietlow argues that the Court should adopt a
communitarian theory of process in which the
Court would recognize that if welfare recipients did not have pre-termination
hearings, the state could act arbitrarily in denying them benefits, and find that the
danger of that arbitrary action alone is enough to violate the constitutional provision of due process. Second the Court would find it constitutionally impermissible for welfare recipients to have fewer procedural rights than other,
more affluent recipients of government benefits, such as holders of medical
licenses and members of the legal bar. Finally, the Court also would find that the
dire consequences ofdisenfranchising the poorest ofthe poor by subjecting them
to a system that is completely arbitrary and would violate the fundamental notion
of fairness which is essential to a communitarian notion of process.
/d.
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A relatively recent Supreme Court case raises questions about the
analysis of the importance of a right in the determination of whether there
is a protected property interest, and concerns about the potential chilling
effect on a state's development of regulations. In Sandin v. Connor, 103 the
Court found that state regulations regarding the conduct of disciplinary
proceedings in a Hawaiian penitentiary did not create a liberty interest that
would entitle an inmate to due process. 104 The Court found that the prisoner's right to be free from segregation was not sufficiently important to
create a liberty interest. 105 Thus, some commentators are concerned that this
may signal an additional requirement in establishing a property interest: a
showing of the importance of the benefit. 106 While this additional requirement has limited prisoners' rights to due process, in the welfare context,
particularly in cases where children are involved, it should be easier to
demonstrate the importance of the benefit.

(f) Transitional Due Process
A developing concept of 'transitional due process' 107 will become
increasingly important as states innovate new approaches to welfare and
make adjustments to their existing welfare programs. Additionally, transitional due process will become increasingly important as Congress makes
adjustments to the current welfare law that is now set to expire in 2002. In
the Seventh Circuit case, Youakim v. McDonald,108 the court found that
where welfare recipients would qualify for benefits under a new state program, recipients have a sufficient property interest in continued benefits to
require that the state give them notice of the pro~am changes that would
allow them to qualify for uninterrupted benefits. 10 In that case, the state legislature changed the licensing requirements for families to qualify as foster
parents.110 Many of the foster parents would have qualified as licensed
placements under the new re~uirements if they had been given sufficient notice of the proposed changes. 11 Because the foster parents failed to meet the
time lines, they did not qualify for continuing benefits. However, by defining
the property interest as a continuing right of children to receive benefits
rather than the right of the foster parents, the court in Youakim provided
additional procedural protections to the foster children in that state. 112
One of the main reasons for the plaintiffs' success in this case was their
choice to assert that the property right in the benefits belonged to the children. 113 Therefore, examining welfare reductions and terminations from the
515 u.s. 472 ( 1995).
/d. at 487.
105
/d. at 486.
106
Morawetz, supra note 63, at I 02.
107
John Bouman, Due Process for Welfare Recipients Subject to Changing Program
Rules: An Illinois Case Study, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. I 09, 117 ( 1996).
108
71 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1995).
1
()9/d. at 1293.
110
/d. at 1291.
111
/d.
11 2
/d. at 1288- 99.
113
Bouman, supra note 107, at 117.
103
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children's perspective may strengthen claims of transitional due process.
This is especially true in cases where the children would qualify for benefits
un-der the state plan's objective criteria or when the plans are otherwise
arbitrary. 114

2. Once a Property Interest Has Been Established, What Process is Due?
While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest, ... it
may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest,
once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards ... the adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of a statutorily created
property interest must be analyzed in constitutional terms. 115

The 1996 PRA raises difficult questions about whether there is a statutory
entitlement to process. However, once it has been established that there is
a protected property interest, existing law should still govern the types of
constitutionally required procedural protections. The Supreme Court has
found that welfare recipients are entitled to different kinds of procedural
protections depending on the type of welfare cuts they face. The following
discussion will lay out the federal constitutional due process analysis in two
situations: first, where the government makes across-the-board cuts in
programs and, second, where individuals seek redress for improper application or termination procedures.

(a) Across-the-Board Cuts
In determining the amount of process that is due to recipients in challenging across-the-board cuts, the Supreme Court has found that the legislative process is "all the process that is due." 116 In the case of an across-theboard elimination or reduction in benefits, the Court held in Atkins v.
Parker 117 that "it must be assumed that Congress had plenary power to
define the scope and duration of the entitlement to food-stamp benefits to
increase, decrease, or terminate those benefits based on its appraisal of the
relative importance of the recipients' needs and the resources available to
fund the program. The procedural component of the Due Process Clause
does not 'impose a limitation on the power of Congress to make substantive
11 4
ft might also be possible to argue that the federal and state laws requiring due process
hearings create a protected interest in those hearings. So, at least, applicants or recipients of
T ANF would have a constitutionally protected right to fair procedures. This might mitigate
the fear and humiliation of workers who are subject to the arbitrary whims of supervisors and
also protect children from losing their basic means of subsistence without their parents even
getting a chance to contest the arbitrary action prior to the family losing its basic means of
support.
115
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Memphis Light, Gas & Water v. Craft, 436 U.S. I, 14 ( 1975) (holding that
notice is required under Due Process Clause to inform individuals of hearing to determi ne
property interest).
116
Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129-30 (1984). But see U.S.D.A. v. Murry,413 U.S.
508, 514 ( 1973) (finding substantive due process violations where sections of Food Stamp
Act were not rationa lly related to purposes of statute).
117
472 u.s. 115 (1984).
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changes in the law of entitlement to public benefits. "' 118 The Atkins Court
noted that "a welfare recipient is not deprived of due process when the
legislature adjusts benefit levels[;] ... the legislative determination provides
all the process that is due. " 119
This reasoning may suggest that even where welfare recipients have a
property interest in continuing benefits, they are not entitled to any procedural protections once Congress has passed a law authorizing across-theboard cuts. However, as discussed above, as Congress and the states make
changes in welfare programs, it may be possible to challenge some of the
across-the-board cuts by establishing transitional due process rights, which
were found in the case of Youakim v. McDonald, as discussed above. 120
As Congress and the states change the eligibility requirements for
welfare, it will be essential to view the changes from the perspective of the
children who may have a right to continuing benefits under the new eligibility rules. So, for example, if a state imposes new across-the-board work
requirements with which the parents are not able to comply, and the family
is effectively terminated, it may be possible to argue that children have
transitional due process rights to continuing benefits if the children would
qualify for benefits under the new provisions. It will be vital to focus on
whether it is possible to prove that children have individual rights to benefits under the new requirements if they or their parents had an adequate
notice and opportunity to comply with the new requirements. In other
words, if children would have qualified for benefits under the new requirements, they should have an individual right to a hearing, even though the
change appears to be an across-the-board change.
(b) Individual Reductions or Terminations

Once an individual property interest is established, the language of
Goldberg v. Kelly should still dictate the process that is due. 121 In Goldberg,
the Supreme Court held that "[t)he crucial factor in this context ... is that
the termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility
may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while
he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes
immediately desperate." 122 Because TANF is a needs-based program and
recipients face the same brutal need as the welfare recipients in Goldberg,
the same Goldberg reasoning should apply to TANF recipients once a
property interest in this program is established, and therefore, a full-scale

118

/d. at 128 (quoting Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78,81 (1971)).
ld. at 129- 30 (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. 455 U.S. 422, 432- 33
(1982)~ · Rosasv. McMahon, 945 F.2d 1469,1475 (1991).
0
I See infra Part IV (discussing substantive due process analysis for violation of
children's rights).
121
397
254, 254 ( 1970).
122
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
119

u.s.
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pre-deprivation hearing should be protected by the Constitution. It should
not be necessary to do any further analysis. 123
Since the funds for hearings come out of block grants, clients as a
whole will be decreasin~ the amount of available funds in order to support
their right to a hearing. 1 4 Additionally, the right to a hearing prior totermination ofbenefits may not appear to be much of a consolation for people
who have no means to eat or support their families. 125 However, appeals of
terminations or reductions can be successful. For example, one early study
of benefit terminations found that forty-four percent of benefit termination
notices in one county were subsequently reversed. 126
Moreover, "[p )reventing the wrongful termination of benefits
is ... even more important as decisions about welfare recipients are taking
on an increasingly moral and punitive tone." 127 As states increasingly delegate authority to terminate benefits to employers and other private contractors, due process rights will be increasingly important to protect TANF
recipients and their children from arbitrary and untimely termination oftheir
benefits. Without access to a hearing prior to the termination of their benefits, participants in welfare-to-work programs would be at the mercy of
private employers who may sexually harass them or expose them to dangerous working conditions, while threatening to terminate their subsistence
benefits.
For example, an affidavit of one of the workers in the New York city
jobs program gives graphic details on abuses by the city employer and demonstrates the importance of protecting workers from termination of their
benefits without hearings prior to benefit termination.

123
If Goldberg were not binding, the amount ofconstitutionally protected process would
be detennined by analyzing four factors: (I) the private interest that will be affected by the
government action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest though the
procedures used, (3) the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (4) the government's interest, including the functions involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural safeguards would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 ( 1976). It is unclear how these factors are actually
measured or valued against each other. See generally Jerry Mashaw, The Supreme Court's
Due Process Calculus for Administrative in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search
ofa Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 ( 1976) (discussing difficulties in application of
Supreme Court's analysis). However, TANF recipients would have strong arguments-at
least on the first two factors-because of the brutal need for the benefits and the significant
risk of erroneous deprivation without pre-deprivation hearings. As to the third factor, see
Nancy Morawetz, A Due Process Primer: Litigating Government Benefit Cases in the Block
Grant Era, 30(2) CLEARINGHOUSE REv., 97, I 0 I ( 1996) (arguing that under this framework
recipients and state "share an interest in directing .. . resources toward those who are eligible
for a program"). Thus, the administrati ve "burden" also serves the agencies in detennining
whether services are delivered to eligible people.
124
Pub. L. No. I 04-193, I I 0 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.A.).
125/d.
126
WELFARE REFORM-STATES EARLY EXPERIENCE WlTH BENEFIT TERMINATION, US
GENERALACCOUNTJNG0FFJCEREPORTTOCOMMITTEEONFINANCE, 7, U.S. Senate May 15,
1997 (recognizing that "[i]n Milwaukee County, 44% of benefit tennination notices ... were
subsequently reversed because county officials detennined that program requirements had
been met or the sanctions had been based on inaccurate d ata").
127
Chase, supra note 99, at 589.

798

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2000: 779

[W]hile riding in the van, we came across two dead cats and two dead
dogs. They had been dumped by the side of the road. Because I had no
gloves, I had to pick them up with my bare hands. The animals had been
run over by automobiles and were oozing blood and entrails. When I
picked up the animals with my bare hands to throw them into the garbage
truck, the guts splattered on my shoes and pants .... My supervisor, sitting in the van said nothing. I have seen other people who were terminated by my supervisor for refusing to pick up things, and I was afraid
that ifl refused to leave the van or left the carcasses in the gutter I would
be terminated also. 128

In another example, again in New York, welfare recipients under the
new welfare program who had been found able to work with limitations
failed to receive adequate notice of their ri~hts to receive benefits and the
right to challenge their work assignments. 29 One example of this was a
woman who died of a heart attack while performing work duties that were
incompatible with her documented medical history. Another woman was
hospitalized and others lost their basic means of subsistence because of the
failure to provide adequate notice and appeal procedures. 130
In sum, the "no entitlement" language of the PRA indicating that no
state TANF program can create an entitlement does not mean that there is
no constitutionally protected property interest in welfare benefits. Rather,
it means that a particular person is not entitled to welfare benefits based on
federally mandated qualifications. Federal constitutional protections for
TANF recipients will not turn solely on the "no entitlement" language.
Rather, courts are likely to focus on the objective eligibility criteria and
whether the contested actions were arbitrary in determining whether an individual has a protected property interest. By examining these issues from
the perspective of the children who face termination of their benefits, courts
may be more likely to find a protected property interest. Once a property
interest is established, Goldberg v. Kelly entitles recipients of need based
programs to due process because "[the] termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits." 13 1

B. Other Potential Federal Constitutional Protections
This section will focus on the substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution as the analysis under these
provisions may be useful in developing interpretations of parallel state
constitutional provisions. This section does not attempt to specifically
address all of the provisions of the 1996 reforms or the many attempts that
states will make to deprive people of their very means of subsistence, either
under the state plans or by imposing individual sanctions and terminations.
Rather, it sets forth a framework for arguing that many state plans and in-

128

Tamika Capers, Welfare as They Know It , HARPER'S MAG. , Nov. 1997, at 24, 26.
Mitchell v. Barrios-Paoli, 687 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
/d. at 323.
131
Goldberg, 397 U.S . at. 264.
129
130

No.4

CHILDREN IN POVERTY

799

dividual state actions will not withstand scrutiny by the courts because of
the many false assumptions underlying the current welfare laws.
In reviewing alleged violations of substantive due process, the United
States Supreme Court has applied three different levels of scrutiny: (1)
rational basis, which re~uires only that there be a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest; 32 (2) intermediate scrutiny, which requires "substantial relation to the object of the legislation;" 133 and (3) strict scrutiny,
which requires that measures be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
government interest. 134
The 1996 welfare reforms are based on myths and prejudices about
unwed mothers and illegitimate children and, therefore, may be subject to
challenge under the federal substantive due process analysis. For example,
as discussed more fully below, the work requirements imposed by the PRA
are based on assumptions about the character of welfare recipients rather
than the realities of the job market. Accordingly, the sanctions applied to
welfare recipients who fail to work may be challenged as irrational.

I. Substantive Due Process Challenges
(a) Analysis ofSubstantive Due Process Jurisprudence
Under substantive due process analysis, measures that infringe on
fundamental rights are reviewed with strict scrutiny. Although the Supreme
Court secured due process rights for welfare recipients in Goldberg, noting
that their poverty was often caused by circumstances not within their control, 135 the Court refused to acknowledge a substantive right to due process
in Dandridge v. Williams. 136 In the absence of a fundamental right, measures
that regulate economic interests are reviewed under the rational basis test.
Advocates have therefore attempted to lay the framework for the finding of
a fundamental right to survival or subsistence income so that laws threatening basic survival income would be viewed with heightened scrutiny. Professor Peter Edelman is one of the leaders in the call for the acknowledgment of a fundamental right to subsistence income based on the power of
the state to protect individual citizens from economic exploitation. 137 He
explains "ifthere are certain fundamental rights with which the government
cannot interfere, and if these rights are guaranteed under Due Process
Clauses, then, if the right to subsist is fundamental and if failure to assure
subsistence constitutes interference with the right, the right to governmental
assistance in order to 'survive' can properly be termed one of substantive
due process. " 138 After reviewing the moral and philosophical underpinnings

132
See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 ( 1955) (adopting
deferential rational basis test for reviewing economic legislation).
133
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
134
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
mGoldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
136
397 u.s. 471 (1970).
mPeter Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the
Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. I, 6 (1987).
138
/d. at 25.
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of the right to subsistence income and the Supreme Court precedents of the
Lochner v. New York 139 and post-Lochner era, he asserts that "[t]he framework and structure of our Constitution implicitly create affirmative obligations for government in a democratic society, among them an obligation to
provide basic food and shelter." 140 He explains that the "strongest strand"
of precedent for a right to subsistence income can be found in the education
cases that indicate that "some identifiable quantum of education" might be
required. 141 Despite the actual holdings of the education cases, he infers that
the Supreme Court may consider education to be a fundamental right and
that the state has an affirmative duty to provide education to its citizens.
This supports his theory that some rights are so fundamental that the
state has an affirmative duty to fund them for poor people. It also supports
the contention of this Article that courts may be more likely to find an
affirmative duty on the part ofthe government where children are faced with
total deprivation of what mainstream American society considers to benecessities of contemporary life. While acknowledging but attempting to
distinguish decisions by the Supreme Court including Dandridge, which
specifically rejected the strict scrutiny argument, and Harris v. McRae, 142
which denied the state's affirmative duty to fund abortions for poor women,
he concluded in 1987 that the Supreme Court was unlikel~ to leap forward
to establish a fundamental right to subsistence income. 1 3 However, Professor Edelman called upon advocates to continue to pursue his line of
reasoning in state courts in the hopes of increasing the Supreme Court's
receptivity to addressing the problem of survival. 144 Professor Rebecca
Zietlow has recently renewed the call for the creation of a substantive due
process right to subsistence income. 145 She points out that while the Supreme Court has refused to intervene to protect the rights of the poor, "it has

139
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (finding economic substantive due process rights under
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and applying strict scrutiny to legislation
interfering with economic and social rights). Lochner and economic substantive due process
were rejected by the Court in the New Deal Era. The Court later recognized non-economic
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in the later part of the
century. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that substantive due
process encompasses woman's right to choose abortion).
140
Edelrnan, supra note 137, at 32.
141
/d. at 33 (citing San Antonio Jndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 36 ( 1973));
see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,221-22 (1982) (finding Texas statute prohibiting illegal
immigrant children from attending public schools violated Equal Protection Clause).
142
448 u.s. 297 (1980).
143
Edelman, supra note 137, at 3. In fact, Edelman quotes then Judge Antonin Scalia
stating that
the moral precepts of distributive justice ... surely fall within the broad middle
range of moral values that may be embodied in law but need not be. It is
impossible to say that our constitutional traditions mandate the legal imposition
of even so basic a precept of distributive justice as providing food to the
destitute.
!d. at 23 (citing Scalia Speaks, WASH. POST, June 22, 1986, at C2).
144
Edelman, supra note 137, at 55.
14
;See generally Rebecca E. Zietlow, Exploring a Substantive Approach to Equal
Justice Under Law, 28 N.M. L. REv. 411 ( 1998) (arguing that "equal justice as a substantive
concept mandates that substantive resources, particularly economic resources, be distributed
equitably").
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recently taken an activist stance towards those of the more affluent in our
society through its regulatory takings doctrine." 146 She points to the re-cent
takings cases Phillies v. Washington Legal Foundation 141 and Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfe/ 48 and contends, based on the Supreme Court's return
to substantive due process reasoning in recent takings cases on behalf of the
affluent, there is no principled reason why the Court cannot return to substantive due process reasoning to favor the interest of the poor people in our
society. Arguing that since "judicial restraint is at least as activist as judicial
•activism' because it is based on the value judgment that the status quo does
not need to be changed," 149 and the "right to basic subsistence [is] essential
to .. . citizenship of people in our coun~," 150 this right, therefore, should
be affirmatively protected by the courts. 1 1
Another recent commentator, attempting to reconcile the history of
Supreme Court cases regarding welfare rights and substantive due process,
suggests that the apparent inconsistency in cases from Lochner to Harris
can be explained by focusing on "whether or not the poor possess economic
opportunity and are free to make employment choices." 15 Professor Hirsch
contends that Supreme Court cases have consistently turned on the Court's
assumptions about the economic opportunities available to the poor, and that
by focusing on the liberty of pursuit, rather than the pursuit ofliberty, the
Supreme Court cases can be reconciled. He suggests that advocates may be
successful in establishing a right to economic ogportunity by showing that
forces beyond individual control cause poverty. 1 3 He contends that focusing
on the creation of a factual record demonstrating the forces beyond the control of poor people may lead to success in establishing an affirmative right
to economic opportunity. 154
If the Supreme Court acknowledges a fundamental right to subsistence
income or economic opportunity, as these commentators suggest, measures
that infringe on the fundamental right to subsistence would be viewed with
strict scrutiny. Given the Court's history ofblindness to the plight of poor
people, it is unlikely that a fundamental right will be acknowledged at the
federallevel. 155 However, this analysis should be useful in interpreting state
constitutional provisions, especially as the numbers of children in extreme
poverty continue to rise and human suffering becomes increasingly and
painfully apparent in many states.

eato
j"
>n
Je

at
td

1e
ts
m

th

eto

;h
42

n,
rd

oof

's
;a
1e
ll-

lS

er
)0

ss
IIC

~e

ue

146

ia

a/
1e

!d

CHILDREN IN POVERTY

801

/d. at 427.
524 U.S. 156 (1998) (finding that Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA)
constitute 'takings' ).
148
524 U.S. 498 ( 1998) (finding that Coal Act constituted an unconstitutional 'taking').
149
Zietlow, supra note 145, at 431 .
ISO/d. at 449.
15 1
ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 47 , at 24 (pointing out that in 1995 total welfare spending
fell far below approximately $104 billion devoted to tax subsidies and tax breaks for U.S.
corporations).
152
Dennis D. Hirsch, The Right to Economic Opportunity: Making Sense ofthe Supreme
Court 's Welfare Rights Decisions, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 109, 131 (1996).
m id. at 129-30.
154
/d. at 131.
.
155
See generally Hirsh , supra note 152.
147
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Moreover, the finding of an affirmative constitutional right to subsistence income may not be necessary to sustain an effective challenge to some
of the more punitive and irrational provisions of the 1996 Act. The Supreme
Court has already applied informal heightened scrutiny to food stamp provisions that limited children's access to food stamps. For example, in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 156 the Court struck down a food stamp
statute that differentiated between households with related and un-related
members in it. The Court noted that the legislative history behind the statute
indicated that Congress was motivated by an animus against a certain
group-hippies- to pass the statute. 157 Thus, exposure and analysis of the
animus towards poor people that motivated the 1996 reforms may be effective in creating an informal heightened scrutiny of proposed state welfare
plans or individual sanctions. This suggests that due process arguments may
be most successful when coupled with the equal protection arguments
discussed below, which demonstrate a history of animus towards African
Americans-and poor people- in the development of current welfare
policy.
Even ifthe Supreme Court fails to acknowledge a federal constitutional
right to subsistence income or an illegal animus towards minorities and the
poor, there is support in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court for finding
that certain provisions of welfare plans do not meet even the lowest level of
scrutiny. For example, in US.D.A. v. Murry, 158 the Supreme Court struck
down a provision of the Food Stamp Act that denied applications for food
stamps when the parent who applied had not taken a tax deduction for the
child in the previous year. While the Court claimed to analyze the provisions under a rational basis test, it struck down the provision. The Court
held that "the deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in the prior year
is not a rational measure of the need of a different household with which the
child of the tax-deducting parent lives and rests on an irrebuttable presumption often contrary to fact. It therefore lacks critical ingredients of due process."159 Thus, faced with children in poverty who lacked access to food
stamp benefits, the Court struck down the provision as irrational.
In sum, analysis of Supreme Court law in the area of substantive due
process lays the framework for the finding of a federal constitutional right
to subsistence income at some point in the distant future, and can inform
state constitutional discourse. Even in the absence of the finding of a fundamental right, the Court may strike down provisions of welfare laws that are
not rationally related to a legitimate state interest, especially where they can
be shown to be the product of animus towards African Americans or where
children are threatened with deprivation of basic necessities, such as food.
Under either level of scrutiny, it will be important to focus on the flaws in
the assumptions underlying current welfare policy, the inefficiency of many
of its provisions, and the human suffering caused by these irrational policies.

41 3 u.s. 528 (1973).
/d. at 534.
158
413 u.s. 508 ( 1973).
159
/d. at 51 4.
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(b) Application of Substantive Due Process Analysis to the PRA

Applying substantive due process analysis to the work requirements
and lifelong time restrictions of the PRA demonstrates a potential method
for challenging the provisions of the PRA, which are based on false assumptions about welfare recipients. For example, the 1996 welfare re-forms are
based on the common myth that welfare recipients are lazy and do not want
to work. The PRA, therefore, requires the state to show high levels of
employment in their welfare caseloads (only 20% of the caseload can be
exempt from work activities). It also imposes lifelong time limits for all
household members in an effort to induce welfare recipients into the job
market. However, many people on welfare do work. In fact "all of the
growth in extreme child poverty from 1995 to 1997 involved female headed
families who had some work experience during the year. " 160 Some, however,
are not able to find or keep work not because of recipients' moral culpability, but due to circumstances beyond their control, including lack of education, job training, transportation, and childcare. As Julia Henley of the
University of Chicago School of Social Science Administration explains,
[t)he 'welfare debate' has been largely individually focused, centering
around the values of welfare recipients, on the one hand, and their human
capital deficiencies on the other ... Despite the popularity of the value
argument, there is, in fact, little evidence that would suggest welfare
recipients are less oriented toward work or prefer welfare over employment. . . . Overall, the human capital hypothesis has received more empirical support. Recipients with higher skill-levels have shorter average
stays on welfare and are less likely to return after a welfare exit. Moreover, there is an extensive literature documenting the increased importance of post secondary education and training for jobs that pay above the
poverty line. 161

Among adult recipients of welfare at a point in time, approximately
fifty-one percent have less than twelve years of education, forty percent
have no recent work experience, and nineteen percent have a disability that
limits work. 162 These factors create formidable barriers in the job market
that are not likely to be altered by termination of welfare benefits. This finding is supported by recent findings by nine state studies compiled by the
National Governors' Association (NGA) and other organizations, which
found that 40 to 50 percent of families who left TANF did not have a job.163
A New York State study reported that 71 percent of former recipients who

160

WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at I I .
JULIA HENLY, THE LOW WAGE LABOR MARKET HARD LABOR; WOMEN AND WORK
INTHEPOST-WELFARE ERA 63 (Joel Handler & Lucie White, eds., I 999)(citations omitted).
162
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, I04TH CONG. 1996 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WJTHlN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS 508 (table 8-49) (hereinafter 1996 GREEN BOOK].
163
W ELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 8.
161
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last received TANF in March 1997 did not have employer-reported eamings.l64
Without extensive efforts to create sufficient jobs that are appropriate
to the skill level of the current welfare case loads, more people will simply
find themselves without access to a basic means of subsistence. As Professor Martha Minnow states, "requiring mothers of young children to participate in job training and counseling programs and to seek work is simply
unlikely to alter the current . . . state of affairs. Neither tough work requirements nor more money for training and services promise to work. Perhaps
a massive public jobs program could make a difference but that does not
seem to be realistically on the policy agenda in the near future." 165 In fact,
the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the PRA falls 12 billion
dollars short of providing enough funding over the next six years for the
states to meet the work requirements. 166
_
Lack of childcare and transportation are also serious barriers to work
participation. Even the highly publicized child care funding falls more than
one billion dollars short of providing enough fundin~ for all who would
have to work in order to meet the work requirements. 1 7 Anecdotal reports
of mothers trying to comply with work requirements bring these failings to
life. For example, a New York mother reported that faced with termination
of her benefits for failure to cooperate with work requirements, she had to
leave her toddler with a woman who kept her strapped in a dirty stroller all
day. Another reported begging her caseworker to help her find child-care
because the only babysitter she knew had slapped her child. When the caseworker refused, the mother was left without child-care and lost $50 out of
her $260 in cash aid for failing to meet the work requirements.168
Studies of the application of sanctions show that many families are
denied cash assistance for reasons beyond their control. For example, in a
state-funded study of Utah families who were denied assistance for failing
to participate in required activities, 23 percent said that they failed to participate due to lack of transportation, 18 percent due to lack of child care, 43
percent due to a health condition, and 20 percent due to mental health issues.169 The provisions allowing 20 percent of the caseload to be exempt
from work activities are not sufficient to accommodate all ofthe people who
will be unable to engage in work given the lack of available jobs and the
barriers that poor people face in sustaining employment.
Given these findings, it is difficult to see how the work requirement
would withstand scrutiny, even under a rational basis standard. If the pur-

164

WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 5; Martha Fineman, The Inevitability
Depend~ncy and the Politics ofSubsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL' Y REV. 89, 95 (1998).

of

16,Minow, supra note 9, at 834.
166Edelman, supra note 6, at 43, 50.
167!d.

168
WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 29; see also Alan Finder, Is Workfare Working?
A Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Association of the Bar of the City ofNew York, 7 J.L.
& PoL'Y 121, 126 (1999) (finding severe shortage of licensed childcare in New York City
and that workfare participants have impressi on that their welfare benefits would be cut if they
could not secure childcare.)
169
WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 23 .
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pose of the work requirements are to induce work, and the evidence shows
that the welfare recipients are unable to work because jobs are unavailable,
or because they lack childcare, transportation or basic health, then the work
requirements cannot be sustained as rationally related to legitimate state
interests.
The lifelong time limitations on welfare suffer the same flaws. The
PRA attempts to get people off of welfare and into jobs by requiring states
to limit the length of time a family can receive TANF benefits to no more
than five years.170 Estimates indicate that three-quarters of current AFDC
recipients are expected to require welfare assistance for a period extending
beyond five years. Half of the current caseload has already accumulated
more than five years of time on welfare. 171 If these patterns were to continue, beginning in 2002, millions of families would have their benefits
eliminated. 172 And, as set forth above, it is not hopeful that those millions
of parents will find adequate jobs.
Some states have im.gosed lifelong limits even shorter than the federally mandated five years.• 3 Massachusetts, for example, has imposed a twoyear limit. 174 Families are reaching this limit now. The findings of a recent
report demonstrate that the limits have not been successful in increasing job
participation rates and have caused significant hardship even though the law
has provisions allowing extensions. Over 8,400 children have already lost
benefits under the Massachusetts T AFDC time limit. 175 Of these 8400
children, "5,400 are in families where the parent is working but earning so
little that the family qualified for a small supplemental welfare grant before
the time limit hit." 176 Most of the rest of the families have no income at all.
These children were poor before the time limit; they are even poorer now.
The report also profiles several of the families, including a 42-year-old
mother from central Massachusetts who was denied a three-month extension
ofTAFDC benefits she needed to support herself and her one son until she
graduated from a community college in May, 1999. 177 The Department administering TANF (or TAFDC in Massachusetts) issued regulations that no
family will be allowed an extension of their TAFDC benefits to complete
an education or training program. This mother worked in the furniture industry from the time she was 16 until she developed an eye disease from the
chemicals used. Her illness was exacerbated by the stress of divorcing an
abusive husband, the death of her father and sister, and the loss of her
home- all within a short period of time. She concluded that her only option
was to return to school and has used her time on TAFDC for the past two
years to do this. Although she was also working 20 hours per week, she did
not make enough to cover even her rent and utilities. She needed the sup-

170

Except for applicants who received welfare as children.
1996 GREEN BOOK, supra note 162, at 506.
112/d.
173
STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, available at < http://www.clasp.org>.
174
CLOSER LOOK, supra note 24, at ).
11;/d.
17 1

176/d.
111

/d. at 2.
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plemental T AFDC grant to finish school and recuperate from eye surgery
in the spring of 1999. 178 This benefit was denied.
This profile demonstrates how the implementation of a law designed
to promote self-sufficiency and work results in termination of benefits for
recipients who are engaged in the very activities that are likely to lead to
realistic job opportunities in today's job market. Given the significant barriers to work, the rationality of work requirements and time limitations to
induce work is even further strained when viewed from the children's
perspective.
Even if welfare recipients could be blamed for their failure to participate in the job market, the work requirements in most states and the federally mandated time limitations penalize children for their parents failures,
further undermining a rational basis for these welfare reforms. The irrationality of these reforms are demonstrated by the devastating effects that they
are having on poor children the Act is designed, in part, to protect. 179
The hunger and hardships children face strengthens the constitutional
challenge to welfare reforms by demonstrating the irrationality and shortsightedness of penalizing children for actions and inactions of their parents,
often beyond the control of their parents, and are almost always beyond the
control of the child. Focusing on the suffering of children also increases the
chances of building societal consensus that is vital to constitutional
change. 180
As Professor Martha Albertson Fineman effectively articulates in her
article, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, our
society fails to recognize dependency as an inevitable result of the human
condition and relegates caretaking ofdependent people (mostly children and
elderly) to the family where caretaking has been traditionally performed for
free .181 Policymakers, therefore, perceive marriage as the solution to dependency because it effectively hides the costs of caretaking and perpetuates the
myth of independence and the stigma of dependence. They call for marriage
and child support as solutions to the problem, blaming single mothers for
their failure to cover the costs of caretaking with marriage to, and dependence on, a male wage earner.
The failure to acknowledge and value the importance of caretaking
children is not rational. And, as Mimi Abramowitz points out "TANF' s time
limits, stiff work rules and heavy sanctions devalue women's caretaking
work." 182 However, as long as our culture refuses to value the work of
caretakers, it will be important to focus on constitutional arguments that
highlight the suffering of children who are recognized as dependent but
without being stigmatized.
This section has focused on work requirements and time limits, but the
same framework may be used to challenge some of the other punitive provi-

118

/d. at 6.
42 U.S.C. § 60l(J)(a)(Supp. 2000).
Sard, supra note I 2, at 367; Fallon Jr., supra note I 2, at 320-22 (asserting that societal consensus underlies constitutional protections).
181
Fineman, supra note 8, at 92.
182
ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 47, at 53.
179
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sions of the Act that seek to modify behavior based on inaccurate, oversimplified attitudes towards people in poverty. 183 For example, Professor Lucy
Williams demonstrates the irrationality of a Wisconsin pro-gram called
Learnfare,
the predecessor to the current regulations, which requires states to sanction
parents when their children fail to attend school. 184
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Learnfare makes a series of remarkable assumptions about the maturity
and sophistication of teenagers, especially given behavior problems already evident through truancy. For Learnfare to succeed, teens must
understand that their nonattendance at school jeopardizes their family's
economic stability. They must care about family fmances more than their
reasons for not attending school, and they must be willing to change their
behavior to retain approximately seventy-five dollars per month for
Mom. Next, they must not be tempted to use their abili?; to trigger a
sanction as a means to threaten and control their mothers. 8 ~

While these observations and the empirical studies of the results of this
program suggest that Learnfare would not and did not deter truancy, the
current federal law in effect perpetuates this Eolicy of imposing sanctions
on families of children not attending school. 1 6
Many states have also adopted caps on the amount of welfare a family
can receive for children born into families on welfare 187 based on the false
assumptions that mothers on welfare have many children, that they have free
access to medical options for family planning, and that they get pregnant in
order to receive additional benefits. These assumptions are false . Families
on welfare have fewer children on average than non-welfare families. 188
While a federal constitutional challenge to family caps was unsuccessful in
Dandrige, the research demonstrating the lack of correlation between the
receipt of AFDC and the child-bearing decisions of unmarried women, may
provide additional support for the argument that these caps are not rationall~
related to the government purpose of deterring out-of-wedlock births. 1 9
And, as discussed below, the clear intention of the Act- to prevent out-ofwedlock births- may strengthen the cha11enge. 190
In sum, many of the provisions of the PRA may not even be rationally
related to a legitimate state interest because they are based on false assumptions about welfare recipients and the job market. Even ifthe Court does not
find a fundamental right to subsistence income, it may be possible to chal183
See Miriam Wilson & Charles Adams Jr., Welfare Reform: Ohio 's Response, 60
OHJo ST. LJ. 1357, 1361 (1999) (listing federal provisions that affect children and citing
Urban Institute Report Series A-23, NEW FEDERALISM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR STATES.)
184
Lucy A. Will iams, Th e Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform
Proposals, 102 YALE L J. 719, 726 (1992).
185
/d. at 73 1.
186
Pub. L. No. I04-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at U.S.C.A. § 404(1)(1) (Supp. 2000)).
187
The General Temporary Assistance for needy families provision, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,878
(1999).
188
1996 GREEN BOOK, supra note 162, at 1212- 13 app. g (tables 3 I, 32).
189
Williams, supra note 184, at 739.
190
Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions , I 02 HARV. L. REv. 1415, 1433-42
(1 989).
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lenge many of the most draconian provisions of the PRA on the grounds that
they are irrational, especially when the arguments focus on the harm that
welfare cuts pose to children already in poverty.
On a practical note, the factual basis for the allegations underlying the
legal arguments for the right to fundamental subsistence income, as well as
the allegations that policies are irrational, should be demonstrated by facts
at the trial level. To overcome the blindness of courts to the plight of people
in poverty, trial lawyers must bring to life the barriers that poor people face.
It will be important to elicit testimony of welfare clients about their difficulty in finding work or day care or their inability to force their children
to go to school. The constitutional theories advanced here provide an opportunity to present facts that demonstrate the irrationality ofthese reforms.
And, in turn, these factual underpinnings, along with other social science
data, can be compelling and may strengthen these legal arguments at the
federal and state level.
The importance of attempting to educate courts about life in extreme
poverty is demonstrated by a Supreme Court ruling on a case where a man
seeking a discharge of his debts in bankruptcy challenged the filing fee.191
The Court found that the $50 filing fee "should be within his able-bodied
reach." 192 Justice Marshall in his dissent explained:
It may be easy for some people to think that weekly savings of less than
$2 dollars are no burden. But no one who has had close contact with poor
people can fail to understand how close to the margin of survival many
of them are. A sudden illness, for example, may destroy whatever savings
they may have accumulated, and by eliminating any sense of security may
destroy the incentive to save in the future. A pack or two of cigarettes
may be, for them, not a routine purchase but a luxury indulged in only
rarely ... They have more important things to do with what little money
they have- like attempting to provide some comforts for gravely ill child,
as Kras must do. 193

Justice Marshall concluded in this opinion that " (i]t is perfectly proper for
judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful
for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded
assumptions about how people live." 194 Justice Marshall thus demonstrates
how important it is to create an accurate picture of how people live and the
barriers they face in securing transportation, childcare, and basic necessities
of life.
The inclusion of constitutional claims for relief, even if unsuccessful,
provide the legal basis for the introduction of evidence that accurately depicts the challenges poor people face and will help undermine many of the
current myths about welfare recipients. 195 This will increase the sensitivity
and receptivity of the courts to the plight of the poor. The accurate depiction

191

United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 435 ( 1973).
/d. at 449.
)/d. at 460 (Marshall, J. , d issent ing).
194/d.
195
Hirsch, sup ra, note 152, at 125-27.
192
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oflife in poverty, the complex causes of unemployment, and the suffering
of children will be essential in securing relief from the draconian welfare reforms under due process type claims.

2. Equal Protection Challenges
An equal protection analysis under the federal constitution prohibits
'.'invidious discrimination." 196 The Court applies strict scrutiny to state
actions that discriminate against "discrete and insular" 197 minorities who (1)
have immutable characteristics that are not readily subject to change, (2)
have been historically subject to discrimination, and (3) are politically disenfranchised. Generally, this strict scrutiny has been applied to African
Americans, other ethnic minorities, and aliens.198
Laws treading on women's rights and the rights of children born out-ofwedlock are generally viewed with heightened scrutiny. Economic regulations, however, have been reviewed under a rational basis test.

(a) Classification Based on Poverty
While the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that people in poverty
constitute a suspect class, 199 advocates continue to lay the framework for
their constitutional protection- frameworks that may be useful in articulating arguments under state constitutions. For example, Professor Peter Edelman has argued that "the entire economic structure of American society and
a series of specific governmental policy decisions over time have contributed to the existence, scope, depth and perpetuation of poverty" thus
creating a suspect class of people in poverty and a justification for heightened scrutiny of laws affecting the poor. 200 Laws regulating property, contracts, corporations, and criminal laws shape wealth and poverty. Decades
of governmental actions, including massive jobs programs in large cities,
racially based economic policies that left many poor people isolated in inner
cities, and a failure to provide appropriate education have created severe
poverty and, therefore, he argues, violates due process, regardless of the

196

Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654 ( 1966).
United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
198
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 ( 1944). There are many draconian
provisions of the 1996 "reforms" directed at "aliens." Those provisions and the potential
equal protection challenges to those provisions are beyond the scope of this article. See
generally Elizabeth Landry, States as International Law-Breakers: Discrimination Against
Immigrants and Welfare Reform, 71 WASH. L. REv. 1095 (1996) (arguing that legislators
must consider international law when creating proposals that would allow discrimination on
basis of alienage); Liza Cristol-Deman & Richard Edwards, Closing the Door on the
Immigrant Poor, 9 STAN. L. POL'Y REv. 141 (1998) (discussing effects that Title IV of the
PRA will have on immigrants); Welfare Reform- Treatment ofLegal Immigrants-Congress
Authorizes States to Deny Benefits to Non Citizens and Excludes Legal Immigrants from
Federal Aid Programs, II 0 HARV. L. REv. 1191 ( 1997) (arguing that Congress should not
be given deference regarding discriminatory effects of PRA on immigrants when principal
effect of law is to regulate welfare policy and not immi gration policy).
199
See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 ( 1973).
200
Edelman, supra note 137, at 43.
197
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level of scrutiny. 201 While he points to the Supreme Court's Peonage
Cases202 in which a conservative court struck down laws permitting forced
labor under the Thirteenth Amendment, he acknowledges that the Supreme
Court has refused to invalidate facially neutral laws that have a disparate
impact on minorities. 203 He argues that it is time, however, to rethink these
policies.204 As more poor and homeless children appear on our city streets,
courts may eventually become more critical of laws that perpetuate their
poverty, and deny them access to the basic necessities of life.
In the meantime, people in poverty may benefit from alleging violations of equal protection because it will provide an opportunity to challenge
the myths underlying the policies that hold them accountable for their own
poverty. It may also provide evidence ofthe "animus towards certain groups
of people" upon which the court relied in striking down certain food stamp
violations on due process grounds.

(b) Classification Based on Race
Equal protection arguments and allegations of "animus towards a
certain group of people" apply with more force in cases involving AfricanAmericans who are specifically recognized as members of a 'suspect
class.' 205 The history of welfare in this country, the tenor of the recent welfare debates, and recent social science studies suggest that welfare policy
has been in large part motivated by racism against African-Americans.
"Aid to Dependent Children," the predecessor to AFDC and TANF,
was a "small program that assisted the children of women who were white,
widowed, and had been connected to men for a substantial period of their
lives. " 206 The beneficiaries where characterized as the worthy poor. The initial program allowed the states to condition eligibility upon the sexual
morality of women, which was used as a method of excluding African
American women from receiving benefits.207 As widows and orphans were
removed from the rolls into the Social Security system and the welfare
movement of the 1960's led to the inclusion of more African American
208
women on the welfare rolls, the program became racialized and, efforts
increased to stigmatize welfare recipients as undeserving poor. Or as Lucy
Williams puts it, "the image of welfare mothers changed from worthy white

201

/d. at 47.
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 238 (1911) (striking down statute making it
criminal to leave job without repaying an advance); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133,
149 (1914) (upholding federal conviction for peonage of employers who, as permitted by
state law, employed convicted people on coerced basis in lieu of imprisonment and fines);
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., 9 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 820 (1984).
203
Edelman, supra note 137, at 46.
204!d.
205 Korematsu v. Un ited States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
206
Williams, supra note 184, at 723.
207
Williams, supra note 9, at 1176 n.87.
208ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 47, at 25 .
202

9

No.4

e
d

widow to lazy African-American breeder."209 Thus, in 1967, programs began to include work requirements.210
By the 1980s, Ronald Reagan began popularizing the myth of the
welfare queen in a series of speeches about a woman who was alleged to
have collected dozens of welfare checks under several different aliases to
support her and her large family consisting of several children of different
fathers. 211 The image, however, is inaccurate. Most women on welfare are
white.212 Welfare families are, on average, smaller than non-welfare families. 213 And, while incidents of abuse do occur, the welfare queen image has
been overplayed in the national dialogue.
The inaccuracy of the image skews the legislative debate. As Lucy
Williams concludes in her article documenting the role of the media in the
public discourse on welfare, the "media's reductionist, race-conscious
imagery selectively and misleadingly defines welfare ... . Thus it is the exclusion of the diversity of poor women and the complexity and contexts of
their experience which creates the deviant image pewetuating the concept
of individual moral fault and driving legal debate."21
Whether due to media imagery or other factors, social s9ience research
demonstrates that public perceptions about welfare are linked to their racial
attitudes. In his recent book, Why Americans Hate Welfare,215 Martin Gilens, summarizing his empirical research on the attitudes towards welfare,
explains:
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Americans hate welfare because they view it as a program that rewards
the undeserving poor .. .. The American public thinks that most people
who receive welfare are black, and . .. the public thinks that blacks are
less committed to the work ethic than are other Americans .. .. Despite
the fact that African Americans constitute only 36 percent of welfare
recipients and only 27 percent ofpoor Americans, whites attitudes toward
poverty are dominated by their beliefs about blacks. 216

Thus, the perpetuation of the myth of the welfare queen and other
inaccurate assumptions based on race are at the root of many of the current
welfare reforms. Highlighting these inaccuracies may lay the framework for
equal protection challenges even at the federal level or at l\':ast provide
evidence of an animus towards African Americans that will strengthen due
process arguments.
Moreover, "[e]ven though blacks do not constitute the majority of
public welfare recipients, welfare has a disproportionate effect on the Afrit

'y·
I;
f

209

Williams, supra note 9, at 11 78; see also ABRAMOWIT Z, supra note 4 7, at 36 .
Joel F . Handler, "Ending Welfare as We Know lt"- Wrong For Welfare, Wrong f or
Paver~, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 6 (I 994).
"Roger Wilkins, Family Values, The Welfare Act, and My Uncle Sam, 5 G EO. J. ON
FIGHTING P OVERTY 5 I (I 997); Michael Lind, The Southern Coup, N EW REPUBLIC, June 19,
1995, at 20.
212
1996 GREEN BOOK, sup ra note 162.
210

2 13/d.
214

W illiams, supra note 9, at 1196.
supra note 1 I .
216
/d. at 3- 5.
mGILENS,
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ican-American community."217 While disparate impact analysis at the federal level has been essentially eliminated,218 some states may choose to
apply a disparate impact analysis at the state level, thus providing compelling arguments that many of the welfare reforms constitute racial discrimination.
Racial discrimination against African Americans in the job market,
which results in unemployment rates for African Americans at rates almost
double those of white job seekers, also strains the rationality of work requirements and job requirements and skews the debate over moral culpability.219 As a practical matter, it is also important to recognize that whites
do not oppose welfare because they think it primarily benefits blacks but
because they think that it benefits blacks who prefer to live off the government rather than work.220 Thus, in equal protection challenges as well as due
process challenges, it will be vital to demonstrate not only the hard-ships
that uneducated, low-skilled workers face in securing jobs, transportation,
and childcare, but also to point out the added challenges for African Americans in the job market and to shatter the myth of the welfare queen that fuels
221
current misperceptions about race, welfare recipients, and work.

(c) Classification Based on Illegitimacy
The PRA may also be challenged for infringing on the rights of illegitimate children. The PRA is, by its own terms, intended to alleviate the socalled national crisis created by of out-of-wedlock births. 222 Measures that
discriminate on the basis of illegitimacy are viewed with intermediate
scrutiny. While the Supreme Court rejected an e'bual protection challenge
to family caps on AFDC benefits in Dandridge, 3 the Court rationalized
that the policy was not designed to discriminate against illegitimate children
but was otherwise justified by the state's duty to regulate benefits to the
poor and simply reduced the benefits to the entire family. Given the clear intention of Congress to effect the lives and choices regarding children born
out-of-wedlock and the empirical evidence showing that assumptions underlying the family cap provisions are not accurate, family caps may not withstand heightened scrutiny.224

217 Naomi R. Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95
MICH. L. REv. 965, 967 (1997); see also U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 41 3 U.S. 528, 537 (1973 )
(using disparate impact analysis to prove equal protection violation).
218
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976).
2 19
GILENS, supra note II.

220/d.
22 1See generally DAVID ZUCCINO, MYTH OF THE WELFARE QUEEN: A PULITZER PRIZE-

WINNING JOURNALIST'S PORTRAIT OF WOMEN ON THE LINE {1999) (providing journalistic
descrip,tion of lives of women on welfare in Philadelphia).
22
42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. 2000).
221
397 u.s. 471,485-87 (1970).
224 Family caps may also be subject to scrutiny under the "unconstitutional conditions"
doctrine. "The unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds that if the government could not
constitutionally compel compliance with this requirement absent an especially strong justification , it cannot undermine constitutional protections by requiring compliance in exchange
for welfare benefits-effectively buying those rights from individuals who rely on public
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As Justice Marshall argued in his dissent in Dandridge, "government
discrimination between children on the basis of a factor over which they
have no control-the number of their brothers and sisters-bears some
resemblance to the classification between legitimate and i11egitimate children which we condemned as a violation ofthe Equal Protection Clause."225
Focusing on Congressional intent to impact families with out-of-wedlock
children, the law, which was described by Senator Edward Kennedy in the
floor debates as "legislative child abuse,"226 may subject some of its more
punitive measures to heightened scrutiny.
As in the due process jurisprudence, some children have been successful in securing relief even under the rational basis level of scrutiny. In Plyer
v. Doe,221 the Supreme Court struck down a law denying free public education to undocumented alien children on the grounds that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 228 The Court considered the "innocent children ... are [the law's] victims" and noted that the law created a "lifetime
hardshi~ on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling
status." 29 This equal protection argument may strengthen the due process
arguments set forth above and may be used to challenge many of the provisions of the PRA, which was expected to push more than 1 million children into poverty230 and has already pushed over 400,000 into extreme
poverty. 231 Federal constitutional protections have the advantage ofcreating
a baseline of rights for children in poverty across the nation. Advocates

assistance." Catherine Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy
Tales: Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 How. L. J. 473,498
(1995).
[11he PRA conceives of AFDC benefits as a means to impose conditions of
receipt in order to induce the parents of needy children to alter their behavior. In
particular, the PRA is intended to influence personal behavior in areas of autonomy protected by the Constitution, and, perhaps, by the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.
Jonothan Romberg, Is There a Doctrine in the House? Welfare Reform and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 22 FORDHAMURB. L.J. I 051, I 059 ( 1995); Julie A Nice, Making
Conditions Constitutional by Attaching Them to Welfare: The Dangers of Selective Contextual Ignorance ofthe Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 971, 981
(1995~.

25

Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 523 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Edelman, supra note 6, at 45.
22 7
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
228
/d. at 202.
229
/d. at 224; see Sarah Ramsey & Daan Braveman, "Let Them Starve": Government's
Obligation to Children in Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1607, 1621 (1995); see also San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 ( 1973)(providingdefinitions of"suspect" classifications).
230
Ede1man, supra note 6, at 45.
231 WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 2. Professor Zietlow suggests that equal protection arguments may be effective in challenging the denial of a right to due process hearings
on the grounds that "virtually all recipients of government licenses and benefits have a nght
to due process hearing if those benefits are terminated." Rebecca Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don't
Add Up To Rights: The Importance of Preserving Due Measures Process in Li~ht ofRecent
Welfare Reform, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 11 I I, 1143 (1996). She points out that rec~ptentsof dnvers licenses, unemployment insurance, and other government benefit.s are s1mllarly sttuated
to recipients of welfare, and therefore, cannot rationally be demed s1mJiar procedural protections. /d.
226
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should continue to look to federal courts for procedural protections, even in
the wake of the PRA. 232 However, given the current makeup of the Supreme
Court, the pervasive myths about poor families, and the lack ofnational consensus in support of welfare recipients, efforts to expand substantive constitutional protections should focus on a state constitutional analysis. 233 Many
legal scholars have called upon advocates to seek redress under state constitutional provisions.234
V. STATE CONSTITVfiONAL PROTECTIONS

State constitutions
are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond
those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The
legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law- for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed. 235
'

Justice Brennan, speaking at Harvard University in 1977 and again at New
York University in 1986, called upon advocates and courts to seek the development of new rights and remedies under state constitutions. 236 In his
view, the Supreme Court's "contraction of federal rights and remedies on
grounds of federalism should be interpreted as a plain invitation to state
courts to step into the breach." 237
Critics of independent state constitutional jurisprudence argue that
"Americans are now a people who are so alike from state to state, and
whose identity is so much associated with national values and institutions,

232
The new welfare regime raises federal constitutional issues on many fronts. The
United States Supreme Court recently struck down the California welfare scheme on the
grounds that it interferes with the right to travel and the Privileges and Immunities Clause by
limiting welfare benefits to new state residents at the level they received in their former state.
Other federal constitutional issues are raised by the provisions of the Act that appear to infringe on constitutional rights to bear ch ildren, the right to freedom of religion, and other
rights and liberties that have a lready been upheld by the Court in an established body of
constitutional law. It has been suggested that Congress exceeded its powers under the Spending Power, as informed by the Ten th Amendment values, in both limiting a state's authority
to develop its own welfare policies and promulgating the draconian measures preventing
"aliens" from collecting benefits and, therefore, will be subject to strict scrutiny. But see Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 ( 1996) (raising fundamental questions about
whether individuals will continue to be able to sue states); Saenz v. Roc, 119 S . Ct. 1518
(1999) (determining whether Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United
States Constitution may provide avenues for asserting rights of welfare beneficiaries).
msee generally Helen Hershkoff, Rights and Freedoms Under the State Constitution:
A New Deal For Welfare Rights, 13 TOUROL REV. 631 (1997)(exploringeffectofNew Deal
on state constitutions, looking mainly at New York's constitution).
234
Edelman, supra note 137, at 4-8; Rebecca E. Zietlow, Exploring a Substantive Approach to Equal Justice Under Law, 28 N.M. L. REv. 411, 449 ( 1998).
235
William J. Brennan Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection ofindividual R ights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 ( 1977).
236
/d. at 502-03; Will iam J. Brennan Jr., The Bill ofRights and the States: The Revival
ofState Constitutions as Guardians ofindividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535,548 ( 1986).
237
Brennal1, supra note 235, at 502-03.
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that the notion of significant local variations in character and identity is just
too implausible to take seriously as the basis for a distinct constitutional dis-course."238 This concern is compounded by the uncomfortable notion that
legal concepts could have as many different definitions as there are states, 239
and the failure of state courts to develop a coherent discourse of state constitutionallaw.240
However, each state has its own constitution. While "[s]ocial values
may not differ much among states ... political decisions to give value
constitutional stature often have differed."241 Interpretation of the different
political decisions made by the states provides an opportunity to develop a
coherent state constitutional discourse. 242Different interpretation of similar
clauses can add to the development of the discourse. As Paul Kahn explains:
Equality does not have a single, definite meaning in any community prior
to the process of interpretation. It is not a thing waiting to be discovered
by a judge. It only has an identifiable shape after the judge articulates the
conclusion of an interpretive inquiry.. .. The inquiry might turn to any
number of texts, precedents, or historical events, as well as moral intuitions and principled arguments. The best interpretation is that which
achieves the greatest harmony among these diverse sources. We distort
this process if we conceive of it as an effort to put into place a local community's unique concept of equality, instead of the constitutional goal of
equality that is a common aspiration of American life. The same can be
said of liberty, due process, and the other broad values of our
constitutionalism.243
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James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 761, 779 (1992); Daan Braveman, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38
EMORY L. J. 577, 593-94 (1989) (citing arguments that "the recent state constitutional law
movement is a pragmatic, result-oriented, and unprincipled attempt to expand rights and
liberties"); see also Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side ofState Court Activism, 63 TEx. L. REv.
995, 1022-23 (1985) (asserting that desirability of enhanced role for state courts remains unproven); Peter R. Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review
Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REv. 13, 34 (1988)
(stating that history does not justify judicial creation of new rights and liberties under state
constitutions).
239
Justice Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 215,
229 (1992).
240
Gardner, supra note 238, at 763-64. Gardner asserts that state constitutional law
today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting and essentially unintelligible pronouncements. "[l]he fundamental defect responsible for this state of affairs is the failure of state
courts to develop a coherent discourse of state constitutional law- that is, a language in
which it is possible for participants in the legal system to make intelligible claims about the
mean in~ of state constitutions." /d. at 762- 64.
24
Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv.
165, 199 (1984).
242
Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, I 06 HARV.
L.REv. 1147, 1168(1993).
wid. at 1161. "Agreement is not more to be expected of courts than of individuals.
Conflict over the meaning of common values, however, does not imply that each community
has hold of a unique or separate constitutional truth .. . . Differences reflect the rich
possibilities of [constitutional] interpretation." /d.
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Independent state constitutional analysis is particularly appropriate in
the area of welfare rights. One of the stated purposes of the PRA is to give
the states maximum flexibility in designing programs for their own citizens.244 Just as welfare reforms were enacted to provide over fifty laboratories for innovative, experimental solutions to welfare dependency, the state
constitutions and state court systems provide multiple laboratories for
challenges to the PRA based on unique local jurisprudence and rights analysis. It is inconsistent to assert that states need flexibility to develop different approaches to welfare but that the constitutions of each state should
not differ in their approach to welfare and entitlement issues.
To the extent that state constitutional discourse allows states to develop
or define the "identity and character of the polity itself,"245 the development
of state constitutional protections for children in poverty may be an avenue
for demonstrating the concern of the polity about whether its children have
access to the basic means of subsistence. To the extent that a state constitution "enshrines the moral goals for society"246 or serves as an "important
moral restriction"247 on government action, advocates for children in poverty
can challenge the morality of legislative decisions that states make in enacting welfare reform measures that deprive children ofthe basic necessities
of life.
The development of state constitutional protections for children in poverty provides an important opportunity to explore the limits of state constitutional provisions that go to the essence of the social contracts in society248
and cut to the core of our definitions of, and commitment to, equality and
fairness.

A. In General
States should provide additional protections to children in poverty,
even when interpreting clauses that are similar or identical to federal constitutional provisions. 249 As Professor Helen Hershkoff explains in her recent
article on positive rights and state constitutions/50 federal courts are constrained by separation of powers, federalism, and democratic legitimacy. 251
244
Bane & Weissbourd, supra note 31, at 131 . But see Candice Hoke, State Discretion
Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality and a Federalism-Based
Constitutional Challenge, 9 STAN. L. &POL'Y REv. 115, 122- 23 (1998) (arguing that many
federal restrictions significantly limit state autonomy).
245
Gardner, supra note 238, at 816.
246
Christian Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary
Observations on Stale Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth Century West, 25 RUTGERS L
J. 945,965 (1994).
241
/d. at 966.
248
Hershkoff, supra note 233, at 646.
249
Each state must decide its own method for determining whether and how to apply
independent state analysis of constitutional claims. For an organized analysis of these
methods, see Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology,
28 N.M. L REv. 199,206--20 (1998).
250
Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationa/ityReview, 112HARV.LREv. 1131,1131 (1999).
251
/d. at 1167--68. Professor Hershkoff includes separation of powers as another
constraint.
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Federal courts contend that it is institutionally improper for unelected
federal judges to second- guess the policy making judgments of democratically elected state officials who theoretically have more expertise on issues
of welfare policy. 252 Additionally, our federal system requires the federal
government to be "sensitive to the interests of the state governments and
avoids undue interference with the legitimate activities of those governments. "253 These concerns are compounded by the "long-standing principles
requiring deference to state sovereignty in issuing any orders that would
have the effect of requiring increased state expenditures."254
State courts should not face those constraints. 255 The development of
state constitutional protections for children should not require state courts
to legislate beyond providing remedies similar to those that they regularly
impose on parties in disputes. State courts are the local entity to which our
federalist system defers in defining states rights. Most state court judges are
accountable through state political systems, elections/ 56 and state constitutional amendments. 257
In the area of constitutional protections for children against terminations or reductions in welfare benefits, differences between state and federal
constitutional text and the special responsibilities that the state has in caring
for its children, create a duty to depart from federal analysis which does not
adequately protect children in poverty. 258 As the human suffering-especially the suffering of children-<:aused by welfare reform becomes more visible, state courts may be more willing to construe their own
state constitutions as mandating relief
The following discussion does not attempt to provide in-depth analysis
of the many possible grounds for state constitutional protections for children. Rather, the discussion will explore some state constitution provisions
and the analytical tools that should be explored further by advocates and
scholars concerned with constitutional protections for children in poverty.
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Braveman,supra note23 8, at612(citing Youngerv. Harris,401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
254
Sard, supra note 12, at 380.
255
Hershkoff, supra note 250, at 11 70-71.
25
6'J'his political accountability may pose a challenge to advocates for children in
poverty. Burt Neubome, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20
RUTGERS L. REV. 881, 883 ( 1989) ("When as now, the bulk of the population appears
satisfied by the status quo, democracy and negative rights may no longer be effective vehicles
for dealing with the structural needs of a chronically weak and permanently outvoted underclass."); see also Braveman, supra note 238, at 609- 13 (stating "it is hopeful, however, that
the focus on the suffering of children and the costs of that suffering will provide some political cover").
257
Braveman, supra note 238, at 610-11.
258
/d. at 593- 94.
253
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B. Due Process and Open Courts Clauses
Many state constitutions have clauses similar to the federal Due Process Clause. These clauses include provisions requiring ogen courts, which
are the source of both procedural and substantive rights. 59

1. Procedural Protections260
State procedural due process provisions may be an important source of
procedural rights for children in poverty as federal courts become less
responsive to claims of protected property interests. While federal courts
may reject the concepts of transitional due process or significantly limit the
definition of property interests, state courts will play an important role in
defining the standards and limits of this developing concept. As the federal
doctrine of sovereign immunity expands/61 it will be increasingly important
to define the protected property interest as an interest protected by the state
statutes and constitutions.
State court jurisprudence regarding children's rights in tort claim cases
may also support claims for additional procedural protections for children
under state constitutions. 262 New Mexico's Court of Appeals held that the
application of short statutes of limitations can infringe on children's due
process rights because of "a long tradition of interpreting laws carefully to
safeguard minors. " 263
Procedural protections will be important as state courts implement
changes in programs, or as sanctions are initiated under federally mandated
welfare plans. For example, in New Mexico during the implementation of
welfare reforms between mid-1996 and the end of 1997, welfare case loads
dropped precipitously from approximately 32,000 families to under
16,000.264 It is difficult to imagine that the state could demonstrate that these

259

For example, the Connecticut Constitution provides that "[a]ll courts shall be open,
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course oflaw and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay."
CONN. CONST. art. I , § I 0.
2
60-fhis section addresses only the constitutional baseline for procedural protections. It
does not analyze the statutory rights that exist under individual state plans implementing
TANF.
261
See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 , 650 (2000) (finding
abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit by private individuals exceeds
Congress' authority under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment).
262
See, e.g., Rider v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 923 P.2d 604,608 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996)
(finding child of tender years is not bound by New Mexico Tort Claims Act 90-day notice
provision); Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 180 N.W.2d 778, 784 (1970) (striking down 60day notice provision as violative of an incompetent's right ofdue process). But see Goncalves
v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 332 P.2d 713,715 (1959) (holding that 90-day notice
provision does not violate minor's due process); Harold D. Gordon, Notice of Claim
Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 417, 426 (1975)
(discussing constitutional issues arising from application of notice of claim provisions to
minors,.
2 3
Rider, 923 P.2d at 607.
264
Monthly Statistical Report, State of New Mexico Human Services Department, 15
April 1999.
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dramatic cuts were implemented without treading on the procedural due
process rights of children, especially where caseloads returned to over
24,000265 once the state's current welfare plan was implemented. The lack
ofbenefits, and the uncertainty as togrocess, caused considerable hardship
for welfare recipients in the state. 2 Immediate and dramatic reductions
such as these should be challenged under both the state due process and
open court provisions with support from the torts claims jurisprudence.
2. Substantive Due Process and Open Court Protections
State courts should carefully scrutinize state welfare programs that
threaten children 's access to the basic means of subsistence under Due
Process and Open Courts provisions. State courts should engage in their
own analysis of the federal court decisions in this area, and are free, if not
compelled/67 to avoid the confusing and problematic federal substantive due
process analysis. 268 The interpretation of these clauses will play an important role in the discourse on the constitutional goal of due process "that is
a common aspiration of American life," as Professor Kahn noted above.269
Defining the contours and limits of due process will be challenging.
However, there are some basic rights for children that are secured in most
states that provide a textual basis for the formulation of a state's duty to
children under due process and open courts provisions. As Professor Bravemen suggests in urging states to develop a constitutional analysis that protects impoverished children, one potential doctrine for defining the contours
of the duty is the doctrine regarding the role of the state as parens patriae.270
The common law concept of parens patriae has been used to protect
children who are victims of abuse and neglect. 271
The state often performs that responsibility by removing the children
from their homes and placing them in foster care. It is no mere coincidence that most of these children come from impoverished families. The
stresses of poverty often produce the kind of family dysfunction that
eventually leads to state intervention. The state, however, could perform
its obligation in a Jess intrusive manner by dealing with the underlying
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265/d.
266

lnterview with Bob Ericson, Director, New Mexico Center on Law and Poverty,
Albu'\uerque, N.M. (Oct. 7, 1997).
67
Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Beverlee Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 784 (Cal.
I 981) (stating "we cannot properly relegate our task to the judicial guardians of the federal
Constitution, but instead must recognize our personal obligation to exercise independent legal
judgment in ascertaining the meaning and application of state constitutional provisions").
268
Fallon, st1pra note 12, at 320-22; see, e.g ., Women of the State of Minnesota v.
Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17,29-3 1 (Minn. 1995) (rejecting federal due process analysis and
adopting reasoning of Justice Brennan's dissent in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980),
stating that Minnesota Supreme Court's holding was "better Jaw" and that "Minnesota has an
interest in assuring those within its borders that their disputes will be resolved in accordance
with the states own concepts of justice").
269
Kahn, supra note 242, at 1161 .
270
Braveman, supra note 238, at 606-08; Wasson v. Wasson, 584 P.2d 7 13,7 14 (N.M.
Ct. AJ>~· 1978)
2 1Braveman, supra note 238, at 606- 08.
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poverty . . .. [T]he state will not succeed in performing its protective
obligation unless it is willing to reduce poverty. 272

State law articulations of the parens patriae doctrine provide strong
doctrinal support for the protection of children against cuts in their basic
subsistence income, or at least some level of heightened scrutiny. 273
Under any level of scrutiny, the lack of jobs, transportation, childcare
and other factors in a particular community will provide the factual basis for
the challenge to welfare cuts and sanctions that are intended to protect
children by requiring parents to work. For example, again in New Mexico,
where more than one in three children live in poverty, and 38.9% of children
under five live in poverty, 274 work requirements and lifelong time limits are
irrational in many communities and pose a threat to the children already in
poverty. The New Mexico Department of Commerce estimates that there
will not be sufficient jobs to employ over 23,000 of the people who will be
looking for work in the next five years.275 It will also be possible to show,
again based on the state's own estimates, a severe shortage of age-appropriate child care and transportation. Under these circumstances, irrationality
of sanctions and further welfare cuts should become obvious. These facts
could, of course, be effective in proving both state and federal constitutional
claims.
While efforts to assert similar rights in other states have not always
been effective, it is important to learn from the innovations and perhaps, the
mistakes that advocates made in those cases. For example, advocates in
Connecticut challenged reductions in the state welfare program that could
limit or terminate cash assistance for three months of every year. 276 They
lost the challenge because they failed to demonstrate the injury that the
plaintiffs would suffer as a result of the cuts, but not until hearing the challenge based on state constitutional grounds.277 The claim was based,278 in
part, on the open courts provision of Connecticut's state constitution which
provides that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property, or reputation shall have remedy by due
course of law and right, and justice administered without sale, denial, or
delay." 279 The provision has been interpreted by the Connecticut Supreme
Court to require plaintiff to "bear the heavy burden of establishing that

212
Jd. at 608; see also Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of
the Least Drastic Alternative. 75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1775 (1987) (asserting that states should
limit intervention to "least drastic alternatives" to protect child from real, imminent harm).
273
8raveman, supra note 238, at 608.
274
U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 52.
275
Report of the Bernallilo-Sandoval County Community Council, N.M. Aprill999.
276
Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 744 (Conn. 1995).
277
/d. at 750-70.
278
James M. Scott Ill , Positive Rights- Right to Subsistence Under the Connecticut
Constitution, 27 RuTGERS L. J. 970, 986 ( 1996) (explaining claim methodology and other
factors considered in Moore).
279
Moore, 660 A.2d at 750.
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'redress was available for the type of in~ury at issue ... prior to 1818, '"
when the state constitution was adopted. 80
In an innovative approach to the claim, advocates called a legal historian as an expert witness on Connecticut's history of providing aid to the
poor and called recipients who faced a three month termination of their cash
assistance in an effort to show the human suffering caused by the reductions.281 However, they failed to paint a clear enough picture of the human
suffering caused by the cuts.
The court specifically noted that there had been no testimony regarding
non-governmental sources such as churches, synagogues, private shelters
and soup kitchens, friends or family. 282 The court also pointed out that each
of the testifying recipients who had been terminated, indicated that some
support system other than the government would help them to survive the
months during which they received no cash assistance.283 This supports the
contention that vivid proof of the hardships endured by families who lose
their basic means of support will be essential to successful constitutional
challenges, even at the state level. It also demonstrates that what often appears to advocates to be compelling evidence of the harm suffered by those
without access to the basic necessities of life is not as compelling to judges,
who for the most part, do not have as much contact with the hardship and
uncertainty that is caused when people lose their basic means of subsistence.284
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C. Equal Protection
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As Professor Williams explains in his article on state equality provisions, most state constitutions do not include an Equal Protection Clause,
but they do contain equality provisions.285 In interpreting these state constitutional provisions, state courts should avoid the analytical constructs ofthe
federal constitutional analysis and focus more on the underlying meaning
of equality. Moreover, state courts should consider some of the dissenting
voices in the federal jurisprudence. For example, in Dandridge v Williams, 286 welfare advocates challenged family cap provisions by focusing on
the needs of impoverished children. 287 The United States Supreme Court
upheld the provision applying rational basis scrutiny. 288 In his dissent, Jus-

280

1991)).

Jd. at 751 (quoting Sanzone v. Board of Police Comm'r, 592 A.2d 912,912 (Conn.

~ Jd. at 752-54.
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1d. at 750.
283/d.
284
1t also suggests that advocates might work on developing innovative ways to
demonstrate some of the realities of life in poverty by requesting, for example, visits to
homeless shelters during non-business hours, admission of videotapes of life on the street,
or requesting that the court attempt to create a budget for a family of four at the current
povertts' level.
85
Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L.
REv. 1195, 1196 (1985).
286
397 u.s. 47 1 (1970).
287/d.
288
/d. at 486-88.
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tice Marshall stated that welfare claims involve "the most basic economic
needs of impoverished human beings," and that therefore, there is a "dramatically real factual difference" between [welfare cases] and the other
cases that the Supreme Court has reviewed under rational basis standard. "289
State courts should recognize this difference in developing their own standards for evaluating claims under their equality provisions.
Some state courts have adopted a framework different from the federal
framework. 290 Under one method of interpretation state courts have adopted
the federal frame of analysis but "applie[ d) those constructs independently."291 In those cases, the state courts reach results that directly conflict
with the federal analysis. 292 State courts that adopt the federal framework,
but choose to apply it differently, should be encouraged to review measures
that effect children in poverty with strict scrutiny. While children are not a
"discrete and insular minority,"293 state courts should recognize their needs
and their "position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process"294 and strictly scrutinize
measures that threaten their opportunities to be equal participants in public
life by depriving them of their means to a basic subsistence income.
In developing independent frameworks for equality review, courts
should recognize that measures which limit a child 's access to the basic
means of subsistence also interfere with that child's ability to achieve equality in many spheres of public life, including schooling and employment. 295
The social science literature is replete with studies of how child poverty
interferes with schooling and employment. 296
State constitutional provisions regarding the states' duty to provide free
public education, which are included in every state constitution,297 create a
duty to protect children against measures that threaten children's rights to
basic subsistence income. Studies show that impoverished children are more
likely to fail or drop out of school. 298 As discussed in Part II, "(d]eep
poverty-especially during the earliest years of childhood-has particularly
clear, lon~-lasting effects on children's academic learning and school completion."2 9Thus, children in deep poverty are deprived of their state constitutional right to public education. Welfare cuts that force children into deep
poverty should be challenged as violating children's state constitutional
rights to education.300 Again, defining the contours of the class of protected

189

/d. at 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Williams, supra note 285, at 1219.

290

191Jd.

292/d.
293

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973).
msee Part III supra (discussing problems facing children of welfare recipients).
296
WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 12.
297
Hershkoff, supra note 250, at 1138.
298
See generally supra Part Ill (discussing prob lems facing children of welfare
recipients).
299
WELFARE TO WHAT, supra note 5, at 12.
300
Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 189 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1972); Serrano v.
Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 , 1244 (Cal. 197 1). But see San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. I, 55 (1973) (holding public school financially dependent on local property taxes
294
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children may be challenging, but state courts can look to federal definitions
of extreme poverty as well as emerging international standards. 301
Sanctioning children whose parents have not complied with work
requirements also raises equality concerns. It discriminates against certain
children based on a classification over which they have no control- their
parents' ability to find or keep employment. Similarly, the termination of a
child's benefits where the parent has reached a lifetime limit of 60 months
should be challenged under equality review, especially where children were
not even born at the time their parents received T ANF benefits. Ifcourts apply strict scrutiny to these measures, it is unlikely states will be able to
prove that program-wide restrictions of this nature are the least restrictive
means of reducing the welfare rolls, as explained in analyzing the abortion
funding cases below.302
State constitutional decisions in the tort law area support the rejection
of rational basis scrutiny for measures effecting the well-being of children.
Several courts have held that the rights infringed upon by limitations on the
time to file tort claims are sufficiently important and substantive, and the
class of persons affected sufficiently sensitive to justifr invoking an intermediate standard of review to invalidate the statutes. 30 A child's rights to
the basic means of subsistence are as sensitive and important as an injured
person's right to sue. The reasoning of these cases, therefore, supports the
rejection of rationality review where children's access to basic necessities
is threatened.
While the S~reme Court of the United States has rejected disparate
impact analysis,3 state courts have the opportunity to reconsider that
decision. Some states have already done so. For example, California required busing in the absence of intentional discrimination. 305 Similarly,
states should be encouraged to apply disparate impact analysis to welfare
reform measures that disproportionately impact women or children. These
arguments may be especially successful where the state has an Equal Rights
Amendment.

D. Equal Rights Amendment
Some successes for women have already been achieved under state
equal rights amendments. For example, in New Mexico, which is in the
vanguard of those states creating an independent constitutional jurispru-

does not violate Equal Protection C lause).
301
See generally SHARON DETRICK & PAUL VLAAR!)INGERBROEK, GLOBALIZATION OF
~HILD LAW: THE ROLE OF THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS 7 (1 999) (emphasizing increasing
Impact of treaties on state sovereignty).
302
See Part V.D inf ra (discussing Equal Rights Amendment).
303
Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., 7 63 P.2d 11 53, I I 59-60 (N. M. I 988) (citing
Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 995 (D. Kan . 1985)); Jones v. State Bd. Of Med., 555
P.2d 399, 411 (Idaho 1976), cert. denied, 43 1 U.S. 914 (1 977); Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d
I 058 , I 064 (Kan. 1987); Sibley v. Board of Superviso rs of La. State Univ., 4 77 So.2d 1094,
I I 07 (La. I 985); C arson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d. 825, 833- 34 (N .H. I 980); Arneson v. Olson,
270 N. W.2d I 25, I 33- 35 (N.D. 1978).
3114
Wash ington v. Davis, 42 6 U.S. 229, 248 (I 976).
30
;Crawfo rd v. Board of Educ., 55 1 P.2d 28, 48 (Cal. I 976).
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dence based on its state constitution, 306 advocates for women successfully
challenged restrictions on publicly funded abortions relying on the New
Mexico Constitution.307
In striking down the limits on abortion funding under the New Mexico
Medicaid program, the New Mexico Supreme Court relied on the Equal
Rights Amendment of the New Mexico Constitution.308 The Court declared
that the program discriminated against women by denying certain medically
necessary services to women when there were no similar limitations on
medically necessary medical services for men.309 The New Mexico Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny to the provision310 and the Court found that
once the department elects to provide medically necessary services it cannot
do so in a way that discriminates against some recipients on account of their
gender. 311
The state defended the provision as a legitimate cost saving measure. 312
However, the court, applying strict scrutiny, found that the costs of providing health coverage during pregnancy would be greater than the costs of
providing abortions.313 Therefore, the state failed to show that the provision
was the least restrictive means of reducing costs.314
Similarly, if strict scrutiny were applied to welfare measures, states
would have to prove that they have chosen the least restrictive means of
achieving the goal of reducing welfare costs. Application of this level of
scrutiny to welfare measures could afford some relief to children, as social
scientists develop information on the increased public costs of providing
remedial education and other services to children who are not able to participate in education or employment as a result of a childhood in extreme
poverty.
This may be an area where state discourse leads to formulation of national policy. As an American Bar Association cover story on women's

306
Michael B. Browde, State v. Gomez and the Continuing Conversation Over New
Mexico 's State Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence, 28 N.M. L. REV. 387, 387 n.5 ( 1998);
see also State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 13 (N.M. 1997) (adopting interstitial approach often
diverges from federal result).
307
New Mexico Right to Choose!NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841, 844 (N.M. 1998).
308
/d. at 853- 54; State of New Mexico ex ref. Serna v. Hodges, 552 P.2d 787, 792
(N.M. 1976). As the Supreme Court of New Mexico explained in reviewing the claims under
the state constitution,
[w)e do so as the ultimate arbiters of the law of New Mexico. We are not bound
to give the same meaning to the New Mexico Constitution as the United States
Supreme Court places upon the United States Constitution, even in construing
provisions having wording that is identical, or substantially so, "unless such
interpretations purport to restrict the liberties guaranteed the entire citizenry
under the federal charter."
!d.; see also State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067 (N.M. 1993 ) (finding good faith
exception does not apply to New Mexico Constitution and that framers of constitution "made
it imperative upon the judiciary to give meaning to those rights through judicial review of the
conduct of the separate governmental bodies").
309
Johnson, 975 P.2d at 856.
310
/d. at 854.
311
/d. at 856.
mid.
313
/d. at 857.
314/d.
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rights ~uestioned whether it is "time for an Equal Rights Amendment
push,"3 5 successes on behalf of welfare beneficiaries under state equal
rights amendments may foster doctrinal support for the creation of a federal
right.

E. The Right to Happiness and Safety
"The initial reaction of people to the idea of a constitutional right to
happiness (or safety) is, typically laughter followed (if at all) by dismissal
of the constitutional language as the relic."316 However, many constitutions
include these rights as inalienable.317 Justice Burnett of the California
Supreme Court, in striking down an act infringing on private property rights,
stated, "for the Constitution to declare a right inalienable, and at the same
time leave the Legislature unlimited power over it, would be a contradiction
in terms, an idle provision, proving that the Constitution was a mere parchment barrier, insufficient to protect the citizen."318
The right to adequate food, clothing and shelter are essential elements
of the rights to happiness and safety. This language should not be overlooked in attemptin~ to support and develop constitutional protections for
people in poverty. 31 These clauses provide strong support for heightened
scrutiny of measures that will clearly deprive citizens of the right to happiness and safety .320 The Supreme Court ofNew Jersey, striking down restrictions on publicly funded abortions found that a woman's right to an abortion
is protected based on the Article I of the New Jersey Constitution."321 The
court held that by "declaring the right to life, liberty and the pursuit
of ... happiness," the state constitution "protects the right of privacy." 322
The court then followed the framework of federal equal protection analysis,
applying strict scrutiny to the limitation on state funded abortions.323 While
the court did not specify which words created the right to privacy, the clause

mDebra Baker, The Fight Ain't Over, ABA J., Aug. 1999, at 52, 54.
6
H Joseph Grodin, Rediscovering the State Constitutional Right to Happiness and
Safety HASTINGS CONST. L. Q., Fall 1997, at I, 34.
17
j According to Professor Grodin, the Iowa Constitution is typical in this regard. It
provides that "[a]ll men are, by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable
rights-among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." /d. at
3; IOWA CONST. art. I, § I.
318
Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. I, 17 ( 1857) (Burnett, J., concurring).
319
lt should be noted, however, that the Ohio Court of Appeals has rejected the notion
of an affirmative duty to provide subsistence income under the safety clause of the Ohio State
Constitution. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, has left that question open.
Daugherty v. Wallace, 621 N.E.2d 1374, 1380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); L.T. v. New Jersey
Dep't of Human Servs., 633 A.2d 964, 974 (N.J. 1993).
320
Grodin , supra note 316, at 27. Grodin also contends that these phrases provide a
textual, principled basis for the application of heightened scrutiny under state constitutions,
which is l.acking in some federal substantive due process analysis. Jd. at 28.
321
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925,949 (N.J. 1982) (refusing to fund indigent
women's abortions violated New Jersey Constitution).
322
/d. at 933 .
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securing the right to life, liberty, and the ~ursuit of happiness gave real
substantive rights to women in New Jersey. 24
It will be a challenge to define the contours of these rights. Again,
courts may look to federal definitions of poverty, or developing international standards to define these inalienable rights. And, again, the development of the factual basis for the right to subsistence income should provide
a compelling background that may assist in persuading judges to grant relief
on other grounds.
F. Specific State Constitutional Provisions Addressing Poverty

Many state constitutions contain provisions addressing the needs ofthe
poor.325 They range from general statements to directives. For example, the
Hawaii Constitution provides that government should have "an understanding and compassionate heart toward all people of the earth."326 The North
Carolina Constitution provides that "[b]eneficent provision for the poor, the
unfortunate, and the orphan is one of the first duties of a civilized and a
Christian state."327 The Nevada Constitution provides that the state has a
duty to suraport such "other benevolent institutions as the public good may
require." 3 8 Massachusetts guarantees " food and . .. shelter in time of emergency."329 Many of these provisions do not appear to have been tested by
advocates.330Other states have rejected the notion that there is a state constitutional right to a subsistence income.331
New York, however, has been aggressive in developing an independent
constitutional analysis of welfare issues.332 The New York Constitution
specifically declares that "[t]he aid, care and support of the needy are public
concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions,
and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to
time determine. " 333 This section creates a judicially enforceable ri§ht to public assistance that is "a fundamental part of the social contract."33 The goal
of the New York constitutional provision was to meet "the threat to freedom
that comes from another source-from poverty and insecurity, from sickness and the slum, from social and economic conditions in which human
beings cannot be free.'ms

324Jd.
325
/d.
326
HAW. CONST. Preamble; art. IX,§ 3.
327
N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
328
NEV. CoNST. art. XIII, § I.
329
MASS. CONST. amend. XLVII.
330
Hershkoff, supra note 250, at 1153.
331
Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742,744 (Conn. 1994); Bullock v. Whiteman, 865 P.2d
197,206- 07 (Kan. 1993).
332
Ramsey & Braveman, supra note 229, at 1624.
333
N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § I.
334
Tuckerv. Toia, 371 N.E. 449,45 1- 52 (1977).
llSVERNON A. O'ROURKE & DOUGLAS W. CAMPBELL, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN A
DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN NEW YORK STATE 11 7 ( 1943)(quoting speeches of
Senator Robert F. Wagner Jr. at Constitutional Convention).

779

No.4

real

This constitutional provision was the stated grounds for a successful
claim by children's welfare advocates challenging a statutory provision that
required children to obtain a disposition against parents to be eligible for
state welfare benefits. 336 The New York Court of Appeals found that this
section of the constitution was "intended as an expression . .. of the existence of a positive duty upon the state to aid the needy."337 While the court
has not expanded this reasoning to require a minimum subsistence income,
the court prohibits simply refusing to aid those whom it has classified as
needy. The state " [c ]onstitution is a source of positive law, not merely a set
of limitations on govemment.'ms This is significant, not only in that it
provides an affirmative right to public benefits, but because it demonstrates
how these constitutional provisions may be effective in securing relief for
children in poverty .
State constitutional provisions mandating relief for poor people strongly support heightened scrutiny of legislative actions effecting the poor.
Professor Neubome, explains that

;a in,
rna-

lopvide
~lief

'the
the
.ndlrth
the
td a
LS

a

nay
terby
stient
ton
1lic
ns,
~to

Jboal
:>m
~k

tan

2d

of

827

the very existence of a set of substantive state constitutional provisions
dealing with poverty concerns should transform the approach to state due
process and equality provisions. One can understand the reluctance of a
federal judge to use the federal Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to generate substantive floors in areas that are wholly foreign to the
federal text. Where, however, the constitutional text demonstrates an
intense substantive interest in the plight of the poor, a judge's willingness
to use the state's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to reinforce
the substantive concerns already present in the constitution's text should
be much greater. 339

Professor Hershkoff, in her recent article on positive rights, suggests
that a "court faced with a state constitutional welfare challenge ought to
subject a legislative classification to rigorous scrutiny to determine whether
the provision is likely to effectuate the constitutional goal. ... [T]he proposed approach would shift the burden of proof, imposing a duty on the
state to justify its legislative choices as a well-grounded means of moving
toward a prescribed constitutional goal. " 340 The state would, therefore, have
to prove that a legislature's decision to reduce welfare benefits below
minimum subsistence levels meets the legitimate needs of the poor. "The
fact that the legislature has discretion to design a welfare plan, plaintiffs
would argue, does not give the legislature discretion to design a plan that
does not actually effectuate Article XVII's mandate."341
Specific state constitutional provisions addressing poverty are important sources of affirmative rights. At least they provide persuasive support

mTucker, 371 N.E.2d at 451.
/d.
Brown v. New York, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1137 (1996)
mBurt Neubome, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 881 , 895 (1989).
140
Hershkoff, supra note 250, at I 184 .
141
Helen Hershkoff, Rights and Freedoms Under the State Constitution: A New Deal
For Welfare Rights, 13 TOURO L. REV . 63 1, 649 ( 1997).
337
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for strict scrutiny of measures that threaten access to basic means of subsistence.

G. Separation ofPowers
Advocates may also look to other provisions that may be found in state
constitutions, such as the separation of powers clause. In New Mexico,
advocates for women and children in poverty successfully challenged the
Governor's welfare plan as violating the separation of powers clause of the
New Mexico Constitution.342 Following the passage of the federal PRA, the
Governor of New Mexico vetoed the welfare legislation passed by the state
legislature and imposed his own, more merciless program, ironically titled
"PROGRESS. " 343 As discussed above, over fifteen thousand families-half
of the welfare caseload-were terminated from the welfare rolls. As months
passed, the Governor explored new ways of reducing welfare rolls which
included: redefining income to include housing subsidies; redefining households to include landlords in some cases; and redefining work requirements
and terms of eligibility. Families often discovered that their benefits had
been terminated when they went to collect their benefits.
Advocates successfully challenged the Governor's actions as a violation of the Separation ofPowers Clause of the New Mexico Constitution. 344
The Governor still refused to comply with the New Mexico Supreme
Court's ruling and was held in contempt. 345 The showdown between the
Governor and the New Mexico Supreme Court threatened a constitutional
crisis when the Governor declared that he did not have to comply with the
New Mexico Supreme Court based on his own interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine in which he was not obligated to obey a separate coequal branch of the state government. 346 Consequently, massive confusion
in the administration of the welfare plan reined for months.347 The Governor
backed down and a public confrontation and a constitutional crisis was
narrowly averted. This experience, however, provides insight into how state
constitutional law may lead to unanticipated legal interpretations and state
power dynamics.
State constitutional challenges also raise significant questions about
federal and state power relations. While the federal courts can invalidate
state and federal provisions based on violations of the federal constitution,
and it is easy to conceive that a state court could invalidate an individual
sanction based on state court constitutional provisions, it is far more complex where those sanctions are federally mandated. What happens when a

342

State ofNew Mexico, ex ref. Taylor v. Johnson, 961 P.2d 768, 773-75 (N.M. 1998).
/d. at 772.
344
/d. at 773-75.
J4S/d.
343

)46/d.
347

A clinical law student representing a client whose benefits had been terminated
without notice was told by one caseworker that if she wanted to know what her client was
entitled to she should read that day's newspaper. Interview with Shari Caton, Clinical Law
Student, University of New Mexico School of Law, Law Clinic in Albuquerque, N.M.
(October 15, 1997).
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state supreme court invalidates local program requirements mandated by
federal law that are the source of federal funds for state welfare programs?
The state court could require state funding to offset the state constitutional violation.348 It could also prohibit the state from some actions that
may be encouraged, but not mandated by federal law. For example, "[t]he
general fungability of money available may tempt states to transfer both
federal and state funds into programs formerly funded by the state or programs that are more politically pofular than benefits to marginally employed or unemployed recipients." 34 A state court could prohibit this activity. It could also prohibit cuts in child welfare programs that may be motivated by PRA incentives and the block grant system.
Successful efforts to assert a state constitutional right to subsistence
can also result in a constitutional amendment. For example, efforts to secure
protections for subsistence income were temporarily successful in Montana
where the constitution (prior to amendment) provided that "the legislature
shall provide such economic assistance and social and rehabilitative services
as may be necessary for those inhabitants who, by reason of age, infirmities,
or misfortune may have need for the aid of society."350 However, following
a ruling in favor of welfare families, on this language, Montana amended
this constitutional provision.35 1 The PRA anticipates that some states may
have to modify their constitutions to qualify for funds under the Act by
including and extending grace periods for states that must amend their state
constitutions to comply with the PRA provisions. 352
In spite of complexities in formulating relief, state constitutional provisions provide an opportunity to seek constitutional redress in states where
the federal courts have refused to find constitutional violations. State courts
are not constrained by the federalist concerns of the federal courts, and
many state constitutions include specific provisions addressing poverty, or
securing basic rights as inalienable.
VI. CONCLUSION

Ac¥ording to the House Report that urged adoption of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, commenting on
the predecessor to the current welfare system, the Report noted the "greatest
tragedy of the welfare system is how it harms the Nation's children." 353
Under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act in support of which the Report was written, it is now anticipated that 1.3
million additional children will join the children already living in poverty

H 8See, e.g., New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson , 975 P.2d 841, 844
(N.M. 1998) (allowing state funding to pay for medically necessary abortions).
349Bane & Weissbourd, supra note 31, at 132.
35°MONT. CONST. art. XII,§ 3(3).
351 Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 13 14 (Mont. l986),overruled by Zempl
v. Uninsured Employer's Fund, 938 P.2d 658 , 662 (Mont. 1998) (holding that 1998
amendment of Article XII, § 3(3) overruled Butte Community Union).
m pub. L. No. 104-193, II 0 Stat. 2259 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 603
(Supp. 2000)).
m H.R. REP. No. I 04-651, at 4 ( 1996).
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in this country. There are more children in inadequate daycare and housing
and more children are hungry. As the number of people finding themselves
without the basic necessities of life increases, advocates will be looking to
our federal and state constitutions for protections. While the PRA, on its
face, threatens procedural protections, analysis of federal constitutional
precedent suggests that procedural due process protections may remain.
Many state constitutions are rich with text that may provide a basis for
additional procedural and substantive protections for children in poverty.
The development of federal and state constitutional protections for children
in poverty will play an important role in the new federalist revolution, and
hopefully, will assist in the prevention of human suffering.

